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What follows is an analysis of China's post-1949 policy of 
nationalizing foreign firms. 1 The method of research for this 
monograph was dictated by the subject matter. The only way to 
piece together China's nationalization policy was through access 
to various confidential documents of individual foreign firms and 
various business organizations in Hong Kong and London and 
through interviews of various businessmen and officials, some of 
whom were "interested parties" in the nationalization process. 
Some of these sources required non-attribution. Since China has 
said so little about its nationalization policy, a degree of non-
attribution is the price which the author shares with the reader in 
order to tell the story at all, a common problem among studies of 
nationalization throughout the world. 2 
Chapter One sets out the historical context in which the 
nationalization policy was formulated. Foreign enterprise acted 
both as an agent and benefactor of imperialism in China. When 
imperialism was deprived of its previous power and prerogatives 
to directly influence the business environment in China, the 
profit-making ability of foreign enterprise suffered accordingly. 
Chapter Two analyzes the terms of nationalization as they 
relate to British firms in China. After World War II and the 
Chinese Community victory. neither Great Britain nor British 
firms could play a dominant political and economic role in China. 
In reaction to these changed conditions, various schemes were 
proposed by the firms in an attempt to salvage something from 
the imperialist heritage. But with fixed and immovable assets 
built up over the years, the firms had very little flexibility. They 
could only hope for a modus vivendi, which would now be 
determined by the Chinese but might perhaps be acceptable to the 
firms as well. 
Chapter Three analyzes how the firms had become hostages, 
not only to fixed and immovable assets built up over the years, but 
also to the new government which was determined that the firms 
should repay what China's leaders no doubt believed was a 
historic debt to China: The firms became hostages to the Chinese 
1 l<'or a study of the nationalization policy as it relates to Chinese capitalism, 
Ecklund, "Protracted Expropriation of Private Business in Communist China," 
Paci{ir 4ffairs, Fall 1963, pp. 238-49. Lucien Taire's pro-western diatribe Shanghai 
Episoa• 'Hong Kong: Rainbow Press, 1957) has as its only merit the fact that it is 
one of the few studies to deal even superficially with foreign direct investment m 
China aftet l949. 
2 .Jessica Pernitz Einhorn, Exproprzation Politics (Toronto: Lexington 
Books l974). 
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government's demand that they contmue to operate irrespective of 
losses. 
Chapter Four describes the terms of closure for the large 
British firms. As with any liqutdation, a variety of problems 
inevitably arose, reflecting not nnly the problems of normal 
business dealings but also problems relating to the different needs 
and capacities of the parties involved In the closure process both 
parties had different, if somewhat overlapping, interests. China 
was steadfast to assure the least disruptive transition possible, 
both for the firms' Chinese employees and for the economy as a 
whole. The firms were determined to minimize their financial 
losses, but in a manner which would not jeopardize the firms' 
future trade with China, instead ot m China. 
The fifth and final chapter brmgs the essay full circle to 
summarize what made China's slow-motion nationalization 
possible. State power made legal formalities largely irrelevant. In 
a new position of control, the Chinese, like the English before 
them, employed their power in their own interests. They 
demanded reverse compensation whereby British firms had to 
send money into China to gain permission ultimately to hand over 
to China what the firms' directors viewed as the firms' own assets. 
After several years of trying to resume usual business, the firms 
decided to cut their losses - which the Chinese doubtless viewed 
as historic retribution - and to concentrate on obtaining as large 
a share of China's external trade as possible. Over time a 
mutually beneficial relationship was established, to the benefit of 
both the firms and China. 
The subject of China's current policy toward foreign enter-
prise, which does permit some foreign direct investment of a 
highly restricted nature, is a very recent development. As such a 
general assessment of that policy now would be premature. 
* I am grateful to many people who have helped me with this study, a 
number of whom have chosen to remain anonymous. I would specifically like to 
thank, however, Richard Pfeffer and Robert Tucker, both of Johns Hopkins. 
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Chapter I 
IMPERIALISM AND FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN CHINA: 
AN OVERVIEW 
There has been a great debate over the years about the impact 
of foreign investment on China's economy. There is very little 
debate, however, about the effectiveness with which the Chinese 
Communists have made that issue largely an academic one. Upon 
winning the Chinese Civil War in 1949, their policy of slow-motion 
nationalization, what I have called "hostage capitalism", signaled 
the end of a relatively congenial environment for foreign 
enterprise. A casual walk in downtown Shanghai, China's largest 
city and once the epitome of foreign enterprise in China, is 
illustrative. The custom house clock tower once intoned hourly 
chimes as does Big Ben in London. Yet in the new communist era 
of the 1950's it played the opening bars of "The East is Red." The 
former Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank building, with its imperial 
gray columns and glaring bronze lions, is now the headquarters of 
the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee. 
That there was a foreign stranglehold on key sectors of the 
"modern" economy, now symbolized by the landmarks of what 
was once an international colony, is undeniable. Foreigners 
controlled certain northeastern and southwestern railroads, the 
principal mines and heavy industry, a part of the textile industry, 
the principal urban services and the major share of steam 
navigation. The economic effect throughout the country, however, 
was limited. As late as 1931, over three-quarters of all foreign 
capital invested in China was in Shanghai or Manchuria. And the 
treaty ports remained largely separate from most of the rest of the 
Chinese economy. "New economic activity in them did proportion-
ately little to stimulate new economic activity elsewhere in the 
country," writes a distinguished student of the Chinese economy, 
"and its net impact was thus very much less than the total of 
investment output might otherwise suggest."1 
This was not for lack of effort. For more than a century, 
Western nations and Japan, in the persons of their various 
officials, troops, missionaries and businessmen, asserted and tried 
to enforce their right to do much as they pleased in a semi-
colonized China. Foreign enterprise in particular benefited from 
1. Rhoads Murphy, The Outsiders (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1977), p. 126. 
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its special legal status under extraterritoriality, partial exemp-
tions from Chinese taxation and diplomatic pressure. But the 
effect upon China was a negative one - the Chinese state was 
weakened, contributing to its inability to provide a leadership role 
in modern Chinese society. 
In this context, China's vigorous rejection of the treaty ports 
seems unsurprising; anti-imperialist sentiment was a growing 
reality in modern China. It was a sharp, and in my view deserved, 
reaction to the privileged status, the conspicuousness, and of 
course, the hauteur of the foreign presence in China. The foreign 
officials, troops, missionaries and businessmen were all part of 
the same foreign establishment. As such they shared "in the 
invasion of China's sovereignty which derogated the autonomy 
not only of an abstract policy but also, more critically, the 
autonomy of particular and individual Chinese who apprehended 
and reacted to the intruding foreign presence."2 
The Goal of Nationalization 
In reaction to the de facto power and influence of foreign 
enterprise, the Chinese Communists were committed to eliminate 
foreign capitalist ownership of industrial and commercial enter-
prise in China. Yet this goal could only be achieved after political 
power was won and consolidated, followed by land reforms, 
cooperatives for the production and distribution of goods and, 
eventually, collectivization and nationalization. 
Political commitments do not become political realities over 
night, especially in a variegated China that was both a semi-
colonial and semi-feudal society. This realization was expressed in 
the Chinese Communists' protracted policy after taking political 
power: the overthrow of the forces of external imperialism and 
internal feudalism, not the elimination of foreign or domestic 
capitalism and the abolition of private property. What Mao Tse-
tung termed the new democratic revolution was to establish the 
conditions for both a bourgeois and a socialist revolution. 
As a result there was little that was specifically socialist in 
the policies pursued by the Chinese Communists in the early years 
of the People's Republic (PRC). 
As a matter of moving from one revoiution to the other, Mao 
understood the necessity of slow-motion nationalization of foreign 
direct investment. In 1947 he criticized as "ultra-left" the party 
policies of 1930 to 1934 which included the proposal by the 
2. Albert Feuerwerker, The Foreign Establishment in China in the Early 
Twentieth Century, (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 1976), p. 111. 
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Provisional Soviet Government of Kiangsi Province to directly 
expel and confiscate foreign economic and political power.3 By 
contrast, Mao stressed that while it was necessary "to do away 
with the special privileges of imperialism in China, the revolution 
should distinguish between political and economic annihilation."4 
Criticizing the shortsightedness of past thinking on nationaliza-
tion, Mao stressed that it would be necessary to permit the 
existence of a capitalist sector in the economy for an uncertain 
period after the victory of revolution. As Mao spelled it out: 
In the interest of the whole economy and in the present and 
future interest of the working class and the laboring people, 
we must not restrict the private capitalist economy too much 
or too rigidly, but must leave room for it to exist and develop 
within the framework of the economic policy and planning of 
the People's Republic.5 
Table 1: Foreign Investments in China by Country 1902-36 
(US$ millions; percent in parentheses) 
Country 1902 1914 1931 1936 
Great Britain 260.3( 33.0) 607.5( 37.7) 1189.2( 36.7) 1220.8( 35.0) 
Japan 1.0( 0.1) 219.6( 13.6) 1136.9( 35.1) 1394.0( 40.0) 
Russia 246.5( 31.3) 269.3( 16.7) 273.2( 8.4) 0.0 
United States 19.7( 2.5) 49.3( 3.1) 196.8( 6.1) 298.8( 8.6) 
France 91.1( 11.6) 171.4 ( 10. 7) 192.4( 5.9) 234.1 ( 6.7) 
Germany 164.3( 20.9) 263.6 ( 16.4) 87.0( 2.7) 148.5( 4.3) 
Belgium 4.4( 0.6) 22.9( 1.4) 89.0( 2.7) 58.4( 1.7) 
Netherlands 0.0 0.0 28.7( 0.9) 0.0 
Italy 0.0 0.0 46.4( 1.4) 72.3( 2.1) 
Scandinavia 0.0 0.0 2.9( 0.1) 0.0 
Others 0.6( 0.0) 6.7( 0.4) 0.0 56.3( 1.6) 
787.9 (100.0) 1610.3(100.0) ' 3242.5(100.0) 3483.2(100.0) 
Source: For 1902-1931, see Remer, Foreign Investments, Op. Cit., p. 76, and 
Chi-ming Hou, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China 
184~1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 17. 
3. An analysis of this criticism is in 0. Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century 
China, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964). I have been unable to locate 
this criticism in its original source. 
4. Mao Tse-tung, "The Present Situation and our Tasks," Selected Works, 
Vol. IV, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1969), p. 167. 
5. Ibid. 
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This balanced and cautious policy made good sense. As the 
Chinese Communists decisively shifted their attention to urban 
areas, with their war-related problems of administrative decay 
and structural dislocation, China's new leaders had neither the 
experience nor the training necessary to cope with the demands of 
an urban, industrial economy. Initially much of the economy had 
to be run using existing, conventional methods, often with the 
assistance of incum}?ent, non-Communist personnel, including the 
foreigners who had come to dominate China's urban economy.s 
The Chinese Communists intended to direct as fast as 
possible the transition to a state-owned and state-controlled 
economy. As part of the transformation process, Mao wrote, "we 
must learn to do economic work from all who know how, no 
matter who they are. We must esteem them as teachers, learning 
from them respectfully and conscientiously."7 
A central aspect of this effort was the Chinese Communist-
directed policy of nationalizing foreign capitalist enterprise. Over 
a period of seven years, from 1949 to 1957, the PRC redefined and, 
except for Sino-Soviet Joint Ventures, ended foreign direct 
investment in China. By regulating the conditions for the sale of 
labor and by completely undercutting a congenial profit-making 
environment, the Chinese placed many foreign firms in the "no-
win" position of applying for permission to cease operations in 
China and to agree to an assets against liabilities formula in 
assessing the value of foreign enterprise, all of which made 
compensation for foreign losses a practical impossibility. 
Hostage capitalism as a nationalization policy involved 
almost exclusively British firms. The largest foreign interest in 
China until1931, when the Japanese seized Manchuria and began 
to invest heavily there, was that of Great Britain, both in absolute 
amounts of investment and in relative share (see table). Like the 
investment by other countries, British investment consisted 
primarily of direct investment, although loans to the Chinese 
government were significant as well. The foreign investment of 
other countries in China was not of the scope and scale of British 
investment. As one authority on foreign investments in China in 
the 1930's has observed, "the outstanding fact about the import 
and export trade is the existence of a relatively small number of 
6. See Christopher Howe, Employment and Economic Growth in Urban 
China, 1949-1957, (Cambridge: University Press, 1971), p. 21. 
7. Mao Tse-tung, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," (June, 1949), in 
Selected Works, Vo. IV, Op. Cit., p. 423. 
IMPERIALISM AND FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN CHINA 7 
great firms who control most of the capital invested."8 Among the 
best examples are the British firms Jardine Matheson and 
Company, whose origins antedated the Opium War, and Butter-
field and Swire which commenced business in Shanghai in 1867, 
the British-American Tobacco Company and the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Bank. These firms have long been synonomous with 
foreign enterprise in China. Of course there were other firms as 
well. 
8. C.F. Remer, Foreign Investment m China, (New York: MacMillan 













































THE HISTORIC TuRNABOUT 
Chapter II 
THE HISTORIC TURNABOUT: THE POLITICS OF 
HOSTAGE CAPITALISM 
A. Foreign Enterprise in a 
Revolutionary Era 
B. Revolutionary Realities 
9 
The rise of the Chinese Communists in 1949 to a position of 
uncompromised control in all matters of Chinese life was an 
historic turnabout in the interplay between foreign enterprise and 
revolutionary nationalism in China. In part, because of the speed 
of the Communist takeover, British businessmen initially saw in 
the events of spring 1949 only unrelated and divergent events. 
Without fully appreciating the dramatic change which had taken 
place, they failed to realize that they were no longer a determining 
force in promoting and protecting the previous era's profitmaking 
environment. 
The pre-Communist era in China proved an inadequate guide 
for British businessmen in a new era of revolutionary national-
ism. Because of the general decline of Britain's worldwide 
influence after World War II and the rise to power of the Chinese 
Communists, British businessmen in China could only remain 
passive until the conditions under which foreign capitalism would 
be allowed to operate by the People's Government were made 
clear. Many British firms hoped for some modus vivendi which 
would allow continued profit-making within China. This was not 
possible because of China's domestic policies for economic 
development which did not include a longterm role for foreign 
direct investment. In addition, the profit-making limitations 
directly· related to the Korean War and the UN embargo on China, 
which Britain agreed to observe, dampened British anticipation of 
continued profits. 
A. Foreign Enterprise in a Revolutionary Era 
When the Chinese Communists gained control of China's 
major coastal cities, British firms were virtually defenseless and 
there was no easy withdrawal. With only nominal opposition from 
demoralized Nationalist Chinese armies in the spring of 1949, the 
major cities of the Y angste Valley came under Chinese Commu-
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nist control in quick succession: Nanking (April 23), Hangchow 
(May 3), Wuhan (May 17), and finally Shanghai (May 27) and 
other coastal areas. As the communist forces advanced, British 
business interests expectedly attempted to protect their invest-
ments which the British Chamber of Commerce estimated to be 
worth £1,000,000,000 in Shanghai alone.1 Although it is impossi-
ble to precisely calculate all these assets in money terms, the fact 
that they were large amounts is not disputed. 
Preparing for open battle between Chinese and Nationalist 
troops and the likely threat of damage to British investments, the 
British Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai responded instinc-
tively. The Chamber advocated the "internationalization of 
Shanghai" as a way of keeping Shanghai safe from the 
"interference" of Chinese armies in the civil war.2 "Whether or not 
there will be fighting is impossible to say," reads a Chamber of 
Commerce memorandum to London, "but the declared intention of 
the Nationalists is that they will defend to the bitter end." Even if 
they did not fight, the Nationalists were thought to be prepared to 
strip the city. Some observers thought that they remained in 
Shanghai just for that purpose.3 
Since its broad proposal to place an international military 
cordon around all of Shanghai was impractical, the Chamber of 
Commerce proposed instead a more restricted approach which still 
was beyond Western capabilities.4 The Chamber proposed a joint 
armed intervention by the British, American and French 
governments to encircle the Biind, the Western financial enclave 
along the Whampoa River. This military scheme was reasoned as 
practical since the protective force needed for such an operation 
would not be large, and once the imminent conflict had subsided 
the protective intervention of Western troops could then be 
discontinued. 
1. John Kes~ck, Chairman, British Chamber of Commerce (Shanghai) to 
British Consul-General, Shanghai, December 11, 1948, in China Association 
Minutes and Circulars (C.A.M.C.), 1949. The China Association has traditionally 
been a powerful London-based lobby for British firms doing business in China. 
All monetary units have been converted to British Sterling or U.S. dollars 
based on the official exchange rates at the time. $HK 5. 71 =$US 1; $US 2.80 =UK 1; 
$US 1-Chinese RMP 21,400 (1949); 31,000 (1950); 22,890 (1951); 23,430 (1952); 23,430 
(1953); 25,200 (1954). 
London interview with Sir John Keswick, November 27, 1975. 
2. This was originally proposed in a letter from the British Chamber of 
Commerce to the British Ambassador to China on November 30, 1948. 
3. British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, to China Association, London, 
in C.A.M.C. May 12, 1949 No. 49/G/29. 
4. Ibid. 
THE HISTORIC' TURNABOUT 11 
British firms had to deal simultaneously with several severe 
problems. First and most immediate, the Nationalists' continuing 
blockade of Shanghai caused the closing of the port, and as part 
of a more general industrial paralysis throughout Shanghai, the 
slow stifling of all enterprises in which British capital was 
invested ensued. Affected initially were shipping wharves, 
warehouses, banking and merchant houses. Subsequently, manu-
facturers were affected due to the exhaustion of supplies of needed 
imported raw material and fuel, and the corresponding reduction 
in utility services. 5 
The British Chamber's request for British government 
intervention in terms of the broad "internationalization" proposal 
was apparently never seriously considered in official government 
circles. The Chamber did not, however, give up. Even after the 
Communist takeover of Shanghai, it persisted in requesting 
official British support to directly intervene, the goal now being 
the breaking of the Nationalist blockade of China. The Chamber's 
efforts are testimony to the British business community's 
ingrained dependence on official British military power as well as 
to the various civil war related problems.6 
Realizing the problems created by the blockade in July, 1949, 
Chamber of Commerce representatives noted to Hector McNeil, 
the British Minister of State, that "unless some relief is found, it 
would have to be recognized that the British commercial stake in 
Shanghai might be lost."7 McNeil's response was a flat refusal of 
any assistance, particularly military assistance, owing in part to 
policy differences between the United States and Britain. The 
United States leaned towards withdrawal from, and isolation of, 
China. 8 The British were anxious at all levels to work out a modus 
vivendi, but their post-World War II policy had become subordi-
nated to U.S. policy. The U.S. State Department favored a 
blockade of China out of the fear that American and British 
5. British -Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, to China Association (C.A.), 
London in C.A.M.C. July 4, 1949 No. 49/B/40. 
6. See China Association (London) to British Chamber of Commerce 
(Shanghai), in C.A.M.C., July 21, 1949 No. 49/G/43. 
7. Notes of meeting between C.A. representatives and Mr. Hector McNeil, 
Minister of State, in C.A.M.C., July 28, 1949. 
8. Ibid. 
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private enterprise, if left alone, would cooperate with the Commu-
nists.9 
Given these political realities, discussions between British 
business leaders from Shanghai and Minister Hector McNeil 
could hardly have eased British businessmen's fears for the future 
of British investments in China. The discussions emphasized the 
decided vulnerability of the fixed assets foreigners had built up 
over the previous hundred years in China. Although the firms still 
desired to remain in Shanghai, they faced unusual difficulties. To 
meet the challenge of the difficulties, the British Chamber even 
entertained the possibility of a private "buccaneer" action in an 
effort to break the blockade and to reopen the vital transport link 
between Hong Kong and Shanghai. As a last resort to salvage 
something of the pre-Communist era, but also in a longer term 
view, the Chamber suggested the possibility of putting Taiwan 
under international jurisdiction. Whatever the outcome of the civil 
war, it was argued, China would need finance and an interna-
tional jurisdiction in Taiwan would provide a firm foundation for 
raising money and sustaining profits.10 
Foreign firms' problems had many sources, including the fact 
that the Chinese Communists were not overly sympathetic to their 
problems. New Chinese regulations, for example, prohibited labor 
cutbacks or economic retrenchment on the part of either Chinese 
or foreign private firms. With little profit being made in Shanghai, 
foreign firms were at times compelled to rely for their continued 
financing on resources outside China which previously had been 
withdrawn with relative ease. One British firm reportedly brought 
into China £37,000 from Hong Kong for the month of September, 
.1949, to meet various expenses, mainly wages. 
The Chinese Communists, of course, had pressing problems of 
their own, the resolution of which often required action antagonis-
tic to foreign interests. The new Chinese authorities sought, for 
example, to reduce the effects of inherited inflation by linking 
workers' wages to the price of rice. Due to the effects of war and 
flooding, the price of rice had continued to rise steadily thereby 
increasing wage payments by the firms. As the Chinese tried to 
maintain a steady standard of living, Chinese policy often 
9. For an analysis of the conflicting policy preferences between the American 
government and a single American firm, see Warren W. Tozer, "Last Bridge to 
China: The Shanghai Power Company, The Truman Administration and the 
Chinese Communists," in Diplomatic History, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1977. 
10. Cf. note 8. 
THE HISTORIC TURNABOUT 
required the firms to bring Sterling into China from London and 
Hong Kong. From March to July, 1949 there was a three-fold 
increase in the price of rice in China, the partial cost of which the 
firms were required to pay. 
These initial problems and fears concerning new Chinese 
Government policies were part of longer term problems and fears 
relating to the future of foreign business under Communist rule. 
As early as July, 1949, both individual firms' records and China 
Association records indicate fears among foreign firms, particu-
larly small ones, of liquidation.H These fears were not groundless. 
In Tientsin, foreign banks had been closed and their funds frozen 
in February, 1949. In practical terms this meant that firms with 
no local earnings, a common condition in a war-time situation, 
found it difficult to even pay their staffs. Some firms, like British-
American Tobacco and the oil companies, had stocks which they 
could sell, but at various times others had to borrow from outside 
China. Bringing in funds from outside China was made necessary 
in July when the Chinese authorities in Tientsin exacted an 
£800,00 levy from various groups of private firms, including 
foreign ones.12 
From the vantage point of Shanghai in summer 1949, nobody 
knew if the July levy or other provisions promulgated by the new 
regime should be taken as precedents in planning for an uncertain 
future. From China Association records it appears that some 
British merchants felt that Chinese policy would seek to elbow out 
foreign traders in favor of Chinese rivals as soon as possible. Yet 
few heads of firms believed that completely closing down their 
China-based operations was inevitable. 13 
An important reason for this continued hope for the future 
was that all the propaganda put forward by the Chinese 
Communists urged foreign, as well as Chinese, merchants, 
industrialists and bankers to remain in areas likely to come under 
Communist control as their "assistance would be needed in 
developing the country's trade." After Tientsin was occupied by 
Communist forces in mid-January of 1949, for example, public 
11. See C.A. memorandum, "The Present Position of British Traders in 
China," in C.A.M.C., August 17, 1949 No. 49/G/49. 
12. British Chamber of Commerce (Shanghai) to C.A. (London), in C.A.M.C., 
July 14, 1949, No. 49/F/13. 
13. Cf. 13. 
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announcements from General Chu Teh made this point. 14 A 
similar propaganda effort followed in Shanghai. 
Beyond generalities, however, the specific information which 
would help British businessmen to form an estimate of the new 
regime's policy toward Western firms was not forthcoming. One 
reason may have seen that formulating that policy was not of 
highest priority. In any event, in areas where the Communists 
had taken control they had studiously avoided intercourse with 
the British trade consuls, 15 consequently worrying British 
businessmen. In the case of Jardine Matheson, however, the 
firm's executives did not believe that the Chinese were out to 
completely destroy foreign business activity. 
Jardine Matheson's managers, in addition to certain anxie-
ties, had a very positive initial impression of the new regime. "The 
new authorities appeared to have a very realistic approach to their 
problems," confirmed Sir John Keswick, Jardine Matheson's head 
man in Shanghai at the time. 16 Heavy taxation, for example, was 
not, in Keswick's view, a result of anti-foreignism as such but a 
sign of the need for capital to meet the expenses of a big army and 
a new government. 
Jardine Matheson's early favorable reaction to the new 
regime was also based particularly on its perception of the 
honesty of Chinese Communist tax officials and of a certain 
flexibility among Chinese officials with taxes when general 
economic conditions permitted. "In the process of being examined 
for payment of taxes," Keswick noted, "we came through 
satisfactorily and were left with a favorable impression of the 
efficiency of the examiners." Keswick added, "They used one of 
our telephones in order to call for some information and 
immediately insisted on paying cash for the telephone call they 
had made. They would not accept even the offer of a cigarette!"17 
In addition, certain of China's economic policies actually 
reduced financial pressure on foreign firms, such as the change in 
July, 1950 from requiring constant wages to be based on rice 
quotations to wages based on Parity Deposit Units (P.D.U.). For 
foreign firms this was a more satisfactory arrangement because 
the initial basis for rice prices was liable to manipulation. By 
14. C.A., "General Bulletin," in C.A.M.C., January 20, 1949, No. 49/M/1. 
15. C.A., C.A.M.C., January 20, 1949, No. 49/G/9. 
16. Sir John Keswick of Jardine Matheson and Co., interview, London, 
November 27, 1975. 
17. Ibid. 
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contrast the value of the P.D.U.s was jointly bilsed on current 
quotations for rice, coal, briquettes, cloth and cooking oil which 
were less likely to be manipulated. Foreign enterprise similarly 
benefited from an unexplained waiver on Income Tax # 1, a 
business profits tax for the first eight months of 1949, and from a 
cancellation of the Business License Tax, established before 1949 
by the Nationalist regime as a yearly tax on capital. 
While managers of British firms believed in September, 1949, 
that it was too soon to know if they would be able to trade with the 
new regime, later impressions indicate some optimism that this 
would be the case. Keswick believed that the top people in the 
Chinese Government were able and honest. The rapid takeover in 
the cities, he felt, meant that many "country boys" without urban 
experience were obliged to work in a new and different inviron-
ment. It was on this basis that Keswick attributed any "pettiness 
in labor disputes," which, under the circumstances, he viewed as 
quite excusable.1s 
Pettiness in labor disputes, of course, was not the main issue 
for the future of foreign enterprise in China. The issue of whether 
there was a firm basis for optimism was much more complex. A 
pessimist might have to be convinced of any profit-making future 
in China. Some businessmen believed that quite unrevolutionary 
changes had come about to which foreign enterprise would adjust. 
Nobody was at all certain of his own analysis. Optimistic 
assessments of the profit-making future were accompanied by a 
painful realization, often from the vantage point of Shanghai, that 
a profound irreversible change in business conditions had 
occurred. 
In analyzing his own firm's future, a famous taipan, as the 
heads of the largest firms were called, recognized that a number of 
preexisting conditions for doing business in China had been 
transformed. Most important, he wrote, was that foreign business-
men had to realize that "conditions under which British traders 
have operated in China during the last century have changed 
completely." By this he meant: 
(O)ur treaties of privilege have gone and we shall never see 
extraterritoriality again. This means that we must live and 
trade in China under Chinese law, subject to Chinese habits 
and customs, and with only such protection as our officials 
are able to give us (this will be the same as in the period 
previous to 1842), and subject to the whims of politics which 
18. Ibid. 
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are bound to change during the formative years of the 
current Chinese revolution, which only started not quite four 
decades ago. 19 
In presenting his position that China had in fact made an historic 
turnabout, the taipan concluded that the leftward trend of Chinese 
politics would continue for a number of years, during which time 
British firms would be weakened greatly. These assumptions 
prompted him to conclude that although the Chinese wanted 
foreign trade, foreign traders would only be able to survive the 
trend with trading machinery modeled to fit new conditions. 
A plan was sometimes proposed to deal with the situation, the 
essence of which was the development of a large combine of 
British China firms, each of which would surrender some of its 
individuality in order to prevent debilitating competition among 
themselves within a business environment now controlled by the 
Chinese whose bargaining position was unchallenged. A spirit of 
"united we stand and divided we fall" was a central element of the 
combine proposal. Most important to its proponents was a united 
British front on all political and commercial problems in China 
·with a uniform approach to labor, wage and tax questions. In 
addition, it was hoped thereby to secure maximum business 
efficiency by exploiting economies of scale to provide financial 
strength for large-scale contracts with the Chinese state trading 
companies. According to the plan, joining the combine would have 
been voluntary. Any British firm could remain outside the 
combine, although this was contrary to the directed goal of unity. 
The reaction to the above proposal by a British banker in 
London was one of unambiguous resistance. "Unless the firm and 
its staff can continue as a privately owned or public company on 
its own British feet in China," wrote this businessman, "it must 
dwindle away." No grouping of interests or Sino-British "half-
caste amalgamation," was sufficiently attractive, "or indeed, in 
my opinion, workable in practice."20 The response to the proposal 
reflected skepticism about the irreversible nature of the historic 
turnabout in business conditions in China. "We are in a state of 
change or revolution," a skeptic wrote, and asked, "Must not the 
dust settle before we take drastic decision to act irrevocably?" In 
answer as to h~w to proceed with British trade in an unknown 
19. Confidential document, Shanghai, July 30, 1949. Detailed documentation 
of this and other sources must remain without direct documentation. 
20. Confidential document, London, October 20, 1949. 
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future under monopoly or nationalist conditions, such schemes as 
the combine proposal always surfaced as a possible solution. 
Unable to appreciate from London the difference between the 
temporary difficult conditions of the past and the historic changes 
brought on by the Chinese Communist Revolution, another 
British businessman wrote about mergers in October 1949: 
It is the same urge which I fear prompted me successively to 
scheme for what appeared then to be the only progressive 
enlightened solution for our future, firstly, by taking into 
partnership the Generalissimo and the Soongs, and secondly 
and even more foolhardy, by forming an Anglo-Japanese 
Company to take over all our business in what appeared to 
be then a permanently controlled China by Japan. They were 
both ill-founded ideas, and fortune, perhaps more accurately, 
events, saved us from being led prematurely into such 
commitments, conceived when the forces and circumstances 
surrounding our position in China seemed overwhelmingly 
against us. 21 
The lack of enthusiasm for the 1949 combine proposal 
stemmed directly from a clear understanding of the goal of foreign 
enterprise in China, to make remittable profits from private 
enterprise. The combine should only be a last resort in this view. 
While it was granted that the combine might inevitably be the 
only way to remain in China, it was also thought that the 
combine, even as a last resort, might prove unworkable. British 
firms had offices in London which retained capital and various 
reserves intact; they were reluctant to surrender their identity and 
control of these funds. While the smaller firms with hardly any 
reserves might be willing to join the combine, a British 
businessman noted, "I cannot see the big oil boys, tobacco kings, 
or soap czars, for example, willingly combining until the situation 
is far more crystallized and finally desperate than it is now." 22 
A leading British firm's head representative in Hong Kong 
reflected a view of the business future which was influenced by 
the Chinese banker Wang Ming. Wang's optimism for foreign 
enterprise in China stemmed from two events. First, as part of 
Mao Tse-tung's policy for the period of New Democracy, refugee 
textile industrialists in Hong Kong had been approached by 
Peking to return to Shanghai. Peking, according to Wang Ming, 
21. Confidential document, London, November 2, 1949. 
22. Ibid. 
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had given them assurances against increased demands by labor 
and assurances of free entry and exit from Shanghai. Conse-
quently, many industrialists had decided to return to Shanghai. 
The second source of Wang's optimism was his belief that 
Peking had decided "to let commercial banks in Shanghai carry 
on business as before." A british firm's internal memorandum 
notes: 
These banks apparently still have foreign assets and while 
they have been registered with the new government they 
have not been touched, nor does a reliable source think they 
will be. The new Minister of Economics has recently been in 
Shanghai and the source contacts report to him that it will 
not be the policy of the new regime to nationalize commercial 
banks for at least ten or twenty years as it is realized they 
play an important function in the life of Shanghai which it is 
the desire of the government to build up and further 
industrialize. 23 
These competing assessments of the future for foreign 
enterprise in China reflected the past experiences of each busi-
nessman during the pre-communist era in China. From the van-
tage point of Shanghai it was possible to see most clearly the 
terms of a historic turnabout in China. In London a British 
banker might see only "the possibility of waiting two or three 
years until we can open up again." Wang Ming, who influenced a 
leading British firm's Hong Kong analysis of the future, 
appreciated neither the dramatic changes in business conditions 
in China, nor the speed and irreversibility of that change. 
What is striking in the debate about the future of foreign 
enterprise in China is the early indication of the essentially 
passive role the firms would play in influencing the new rules and 
regulations under which they might operate in China. Unlike the 
hundred years prior to 1949 when British firms and the British 
government significantly determined the business environment 
for foreign capitalism, the Chinese government was now com-
pletely controlling the environment in which these firms precar-
iously existed and, in their own defense, could contribute very 
little. The Chinese Communists, to whose victory foreign firms 
had barely contributed, owed the foreign firms very little, if 
anything at all. And in fact, because they had so little leverage, 
the British firms feared that foreign trade with China would take 
23. Confidential document, London, October 19, 1949. 
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place solely on Chinese terms, perhaps through Chinese govern-
ment monopolies, with the British government unable to do 
anything about it. Gradually foreign businessmen would realize 
that they had become nearly powerless hostages to a past once 
marked by great political and economic power. 
B. Revolutionary Realities 
The Chinese People's Government was determined that 
economic development within China should primarily serve the 
interests of China and its people. On this basis, with the urban 
economy in a state of shambles after almost twenty years of 
continuous warfare, China's new leaders had few sympathies for 
British firms and their profit and loss accounts. Firms questioned 
whether foreign enterprise would be permitted the minimal 
security, opportunity, freedom of movement and freedom from 
excessive taxation required in their view to remain in China. 
But these issues could not be separated from the Chinese 
revolution or the historic downturn in, for example, Britain's 
foreign affairs. The post-World War II era saw the erosion of 
British power and influence throughout Asia, the subordination of 
British policy to American interests and the rise to power of the 
Chinese Communists. The decline of Britain's influence in Asia 
had important repercussions for the security of British firms since 
in the past the preventive and punitive roles of British military 
power had assured protection for these firms in China and helped 
to maintain various privileges. For example, if a British firm were 
having labor troubles, before 1949, a gunboat from Britain's 
China Fleet would be sent to the area as a "precautionary 
measure" to make it "easier for consul and others concerned to 
deal with a difficult situation." Even when things were quiet, as 
Stephen Endicott writes, "British Chambers of Commerce recorded 
their appreciation of the fact that the sight of gunboats comforted 
British merchants by smoothing the channels of trade."24 
The end of Britain's historic gunboat policies is exemplified 
by the April, 1949 incident involving the British frigate H.MS. 
Amethyst. When the Amethyst was sailing from Shanghai to 
Nanking to relieve the destroyer Consort, which was then at 
Nanking and beginning to run short of supplies, the Chinese 
Communists engaged the ship in a battle that eventually involved 
four other British gunboats and resulted in the deaths of several 
24. Stephen Endicott, Diplomacy and Enterprises (Vancouver, B.C.: Univer-
sity of British Columbia Press, 1975), p. 9. 
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hundred British and Chinese troops and the end of gunboat 
diplomacy. After the Amethyst incident the traditional British 
gunboat solution for various problems in China gave way before 
the power and permanence of Chinese Communist rule. 25 
British merchants realized very early after the Communists 
took power that the Chinese Communist Party was "here to stay," 
although some British merchants felt that few Chinese were really 
communists, and that it would take many years to convert them. 
In the new environment, where British merchants no longer could 
depend on warships to solve their problems, the various firms' 
only hope of remaining in China was to reach a mutually 
acceptable modus vivendi with the People's Government. 
Because of the "natural anti-communism" which some 
Britis4. firms viewed as a permanent Chinese characteristic, "the 
best and only way of checking the spread of communism," notes a 
China Association memorandum, "was for democratic powers to 
maintain and develop friendly relations with the Chinese people 
and the Chinese government."26 In pursuit of this policy, the 
China Association exerted its influence in favoring formal 
diplomatic relations between England and China as a precondi-
tion for settling grievances, in the short term, and implementing a 
Treaty of Commerce, from which British firms would no doubt 
profit, in the long termY While a favorable possibility the plan 
remained only a proposal. The British merchants became 
hostages to the determination of the People's Government to 
operate the new economic environment in the interests of its own 
people; the People's Government demanded that they continue to 
operate in China irrespective of their losses. 
While operating with these immediate losses, a major effort of 
the firms was to assess exactly what China's long-term policy 
towards foreign capitalism would be. Some firms, under the 
cumulative effect of several incidents, mainly involving labor and 
tax disputes between British firms and Chinese workers, con-
cluded that their future in China was a limited one. In repre-
senting these firms, Michael Lindsay, the former British Embassy 
press attache, personally delivered a memorandum to Chou En-lai 
noting his impression that "it is the deliberate policy of the new 
government to subject foreign business to obstruction and 
25. Even Luard, Britain and China, (London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 
83-103. 
26. C.A. memorandum, October 11, 1949, Bulletin No. 42. 
27. C.A. memorandum, November 1, 1949, No. 49/E/15. 
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annoyance as part of a plan to drive them out of China."28 The 
cause of Sino-British business troubles in late 1949, according to 
Lindsay, lay in differences between Chinese and British ap-
proaches to problem-solving. Lindsay's impression of the Chinese 
perspective, for example, was to decide on a basic policy of 
principle to be worked out in practice. Lindsay interpreted the 
normal British approach, on the other hand, to be based on 
solving immediate practical problems and, on this basis, to 
develop a "working policy of principle." If both sides would only 
understand and appreciate these differences, Lindsay hoped that 
British firms and the People's Government might be able to live 
together on good terms. 
But Lindsay was wrong. The issue was not whether the 
People's Government and the British firms could live together on 
some abstract "good terms," but on whose terms they would live 
together, if at all. And the answer to that question was 
increasingly clear. In one of the rare public statements of its 
position, the Chinese approach was summed up by China's 
Liberation Daily News in a note in August 1950: 
Although foreign interests are owned by foreigners under the 
jurisdiction of the People's Government these enterprises 
have been deprived of their special privileges which they 
enjoyed in the past . . . if they can dutifully obey all 
ordinances and rulings of the People's Government and 
engage in business which is beneficial to the livelihood of the 
people and the livelihood of our country, they will be 
permitted to exist and will be protected. 29 
Since such explicit policy statements were rare, China's policy 
towards foreign firms has to be extrapolated from these few 
statements as well as from the foreign firms' statements, China 
Association documents and from China's practice. It appears to be 
as follows: The Chinese in the long run wanted to completely take 
control of their economy. This required, in the Chinese view, 
driving foreign capitalists out of the country. The method to 
achieve this goal, as the Liberation News statement suggests, was 
through ordinances and rulings by the People's Government. The 
ensuing indirect approach insured that foreign capitalism 
operated under terms profitable for China and that such 
operations would become relatively unprofitable for the firms. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Liberation Daily, August 6, 1950. 
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Requiring the continued payment of taxes and wages by firms 
was in the People's Government's interest; outright confiscation 
probably was not. 
The opportunity of British firms for profit-making was limited 
by a variety of factors. First and foremost, the People's 
Government was primarily concerned not with their profits but 
with production and the employment of Chinese workers. Cities 
were swollen by refugees; industrial production and most other 
economic activities were far below pre-war peaks; employment 
was high; and inflation and food shortages reflected both a 
collapse of administration and major structural dislocations after 
decades of continuous warfare. To compound these problems, 
China's new leaders had neither the experience nor the training 
necessary to cope with the demands of an urban, industrial 
economy whose reconstruction in any event was hampered by the 
Nationalist blockade. 
The People's Government tried immediately to deal with this 
difficult situation which involved regulating the conditions for the 
sale of China's labor power and completely undercutting the 
ability of foreign capitalism to maintain an environment 
congenial to their profit-making. The effect of these policies on 
British firms was to require remittances from abroad in order to 
meet operating overheads, wages and taxes. 
Closure of businesses was not permitted in China after 1949 
without explicit permission from the People's Government. In 
practice, the government refused to seriously consider requests for 
firms to close down and withdraw staff until the liabilities of the 
firm grew to be nearly equal to or in excess of its assets. The 
length of time during which liabilities accumulated was deter-
mined by the People's Government in the exercise of its sovereign 
prerogatives, not by foreign firms who were now subject to the 
conditions set forth by the new government. These conditions 
included approval for closure only upon labor's agreement to the 
necessity of closing and an acceptable severance pay agreement 
for former employees of the firm. 
Consequently, the firms were caught in a squeeze. On the one 
hand, hostage capitalism meant the refusal on the part of the 
People's Government to permit, by any means, the closure of 
industry or business of value to the nation's economy. On the 
other hand, firms were not in control of their labor policy. Like 
most laws, China's laws were framed in such a way as to permit 
several interpretations. A Western lawyer recalls this difficulty in 
the following way: "The law might read that Unions," for 
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example, "shall not usurp or interfere with the administration 
rights of management," but "unions shall have the right of 
suggestion and protest of any matter which in the opinion of the 
union affects the workers' present or future livelihood.":JJ In 
applying such potentially conflicting principles, arbitration 
seldom found sympathy with foreign firms. Glaring examples of 
the lack of freedom to "do business as usual" occurred during both 
the Nationalist blockade and the UN embargo when wharves in 
Shanghai and other areas were nearly completely closed but 
workers nonetheless had to be paid by the firms. 
The firms were both "hostages" to their past and in some 
sense also "hostages" to their future hopes for China trade. If 
efforts at closure ultimately were depenrlent upon the good will of 
the People's Government, that good will was important to the 
firms for more reasons than one. There still remained the hope for 
future profits. For fear of jeopardizing the potential longer term 
profitable trade relationship between the People's Government 
and a consolidated firm operating outside of China, foreign firms 
were generally uncertain as to how energetically they should 
pursue closure. Thus, short term uncertainty and hard times had 
to be weighed against longer term hopes and expectations. 
For many foreign firms, remittances from reserves abroad 
were necessary to keep the firms operating in times of depressed 
business. And they had to keep operating unless they received 
permission to close. In order to function they had to retain their 
property which, in turn, meant paying tax. To insure that such 
obligations would be met, the Chinese required the continuing 
presence of a senior European firm executive in China. Hostage 
capitalism was reinforced with hostage capitalists. At least one of 
the senior executives, who was required to have Power of 
Attorney, typically was held personally responsible for perfor-
mance of his firm's obligations and payment of taxes, refusal of 
which, for however good reason, might have resulted in imprison-
ment. 
Until permission to cease firm operations was granted, 
permission to leave China was denied for at least one European 
official from within the firm. Thus, when a manager of a large 
firm desired to leave, he was required first to produce for the 
Bureau of Foreign Affairs a letter or telegram from the head office 
appointing his successor, notifying the successor of this appoint-
ment and requesting his acceptance; a letter from the named 
30. Confidential interview, London, November 29, 1975. 
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successor to the existing manager accepting the post and 
accepting full responsibility attached to the position, the succes-
sor's Power of Attorney or the incumbent's Power of Attorney 
with a Deed of Substitution in favor of the successor; and a fairly 
detailed history of the successor's education, working life and 
qualifications. While this requirement was in effect, British firms 
never used the frequently discussed tactic of unilaterally stopping 
remittances of China to force liquidation negotiations to begin. 
They feared jeopardizing the safety of their European staff. 31 
China's rules and regulations were harsh in their effect on 
foreign firms, but they appear to have been strictly enforced 
primarily in the interest of improving the Chinese economy and 
only secondarily for purposes of historic revenge. Nevertheless, at 
times, with all of the regulations placed on foreign firms, trade 
came to a near standstill. Only a few merchants, for example, 
were importing and exporting through Tsingtao and Tientsin. At 
other times, as from January to October 1950, the Chinese 
economy showed substantial signs of improvement and foreign 
firms benefited. As China's currency showed signs of more 
stability, the fear of intolerable tax burden.s receded somewhat, 
and as the pressure to buy new government bonds eased, the 
strains on foreign firms lightened. The rich harvests, the revival 
of modest trade, the evidence of incorruptibility and the develop-
ment of sound reconstruction in China clearly increased confi-
dence in the new government. As a result, internal purchasing 
power and internal trade increased significantly. 
The earlier fear among foreign firms that taxation might take 
the form of confiscatory levies based on presumed ability to pay 
proved largely groundless. Business taxes in fact were levied on 
the basis of turnover. There was a reduction in property taxes of 
thirty-six percent for business premises, of ten percent for 
residential premises and of twenty percent for land tax. These 
developments, perceived by foreign firms as a change in China's 
policy, did not go unappreciated by the firms. 
The short term adjustment by both Peking and foreign firms 
to the new environment, however, did not and could not resolve 
what, in retrospect, can be seen as permanent difficulties in 
Shanghai for all firms. Take for example the case of several 
individual British firms in Shanghai.32 In April, 1950, there was 
31. C.A.M.C., April 4, 1950, No. 50/6/27 and C.A.M.C., "Present Trading 
Conditions in China," October 15, 1950. 
32. Information on the cases that follow must remain without direct attribu· 
tion. 
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little demand for the products of these firms and, with the 
Nationalist blockade, the foreign wharves had done ljttle or no 
business for ten months. To make matters still worse, the 
traditional creditor, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, had no 
deposits of Chinese currency left and did not in any event want 
more financial risks in China. 
Given business conditions, a particular textile firm was in 
crisis. This firm had inventory stocks valued at approximately 
$US 300,000 of which more than half consisted of blankets and 
seasonal yarns for which no volume sales could be expected until 
June. Its large stock of worsted cloth, moreover, had not been 
selling for some time because of the change after 1949 to more 
basic Communist-inspired clothing styles among potential Chi-
nese buyers. Stocks of goods had been difficult to sell except in 
small quantities; the sales price scarcely covered the cost of the 
cotton used in production.33 
Notwithstanding the poor prospects for short-term substantial 
sales revenues, wages and taxes still had to be paid. An additional 
£70,000 was needed before the end of April. This was considered 
impossible to raise, especially since the mill already had an 
overdraft with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank of £120,000 
Although the firm hoped the bank would carry the overdraft as 
long as possible, a bank official noted, "Because deposits are 
decreasing as everyone is drawing out money they have with the 
bank, therefore it might be very difficult to allow the overdraft to 
run on." 
Another British firm, a bottling company, was in an equally 
bad way, perhaps worse. April sales were terrible; only about 
thirty to fifty cases of various drinks a day were being sold, 
whereas sales normally were at least 500 cases a day at this time 
of year. The bottling company, had an overdraft with the Hong 
Kong and Shanghai Bank of approximately £3,000. That loan, 
according to the firm's records, was to be paid on April 10, 1950. 
But there was no money in the bottling company's coffers to meet 
the obligation. All that could be done to deal with the virtually 
hopeless financial quagmire, in the opinion of a Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Bank official, was to let shareholders of each of the 
firms know about the precarious position of their investment. 
The foreign wharf companies had seen only a handful of 
ships come to Shanghai since the liberation of.China. Yet they too 
were being squeezed since overheads had risen substantially. 
33. Confidential document, Shanghai, May 2, 1949. 
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Wages were the main cause of rising overheads. Some Chinese 
workers who in the past had been treated as seasonal employees, 
when work was determined by the company based on the number 
of boats in port, had now been transformed into permanent 
employees under the new mandatory People's Government 
regulations. This meant more than a thousand "permanent" 
Chinese workers were now on the payroll. Attempts by the firms 
to reduce either numbers of workers or wages were unsuccessful. 
One shipping company was draining reserves at the rate of about 
£20,000 a month, with only £85,000 left by April of 1950 out of 
local reserves estimated at the beginning of 1949 at over £200,000. 
The company's annual land taxes alone, levied on both land and 
houses, were approximately £20,000 to £25,000. Consequently, 
"unless some reduction in wages could be secured," a firm's 
director wrote in 1950, "funds would run out before the end of 
June."34 
As can be seen from the condition of these firms, British firms 
generally were in trouble. At the highest decision-making levels 
among British executives in Hong Kong, London and Shanghai, 
discussions were held in search of a course of action to protect the 
firms against the pressures of hostage capitalism. 
The fact was, however, that many British firms did have a 
policy to minimize losses under currently unfavorable but 
uncertain conditions. "I considered we did have a policy but the 
implementation of any policy was entirely dependent on the 
conditions under which it could be executed." On what the future 
profitability for the firm might be, "I found myself like the 
agnostic," a famous Shanghai taipan noted "I just did not know 
. . . the signs were that our future in China was hopeless, but I 
was never prepared to say definitely that we would not survive."35 
The harsh reality of the firms' poor bargaining position 
starkly determined their policies. Differences in the degree of 
optimism for the firms' future prospects in China among senior 
firm executives, and their differences in outlook, which in normal 
times might have been significant, were made insignificant by 
that harsh reality. No matter the differences in attitude, the heads 
of leading British firms per force agreed on the immediate policy 
to employ: reduce overhead, reduce commitments by refusing all 
offers of new business, trade only in profitable fields and prepare 
for closure when and if the opportunity should arise. 
34. Confidential document, Shanghai, April 8, 1950. 
35. Confidential interview, London, November 28, 1975. 
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In pursuance of this policy, one firm in Shanghai managed 
between May, 1949 and May, 1950 to reduce its own staff as 
follows: British employees from 48 to 43, or 26%; local foreigners 
33 to 22, or 33%; Chinese from 321 to 290, or 10%. 
The same firm's preparations for liquidation involved com-
municating a two-sided message to the Chinese authorities. It 
would not further finance from holdings abroad its various 
business operations in China and, without Chinese cooperation, 
the firms would simply dissolve. With a view towards their 
liquidation, target dates for the closure of trade offices outside 
Shanghai, in Chungking, !chang, Changsha, Hankow, Kinkiang, 
Wuhu, Nanking, Chinkiang, Foochow, Tsingtao, Tientsin, Canton 
and Swatow were also set. Thus, the firm in preparing for closure 
sought to limit additional remittances to China to extricate itself 
from investments in China while, at the same time, endeavoring 
to concentrate on trade with China in order both to cover various 
other losses and tailor its operations to a new trade-dominated 
relationship with China. 
If the closure of British direct investment in China was 
inevitable, hopes for a long-term relationship often were difficult 
to sustain. The short-term trade prospects varied with more 
general international conditions. Generally speaking many 
British firms benefited, on the one hand, by the beginning of the 
Korean War, which resulted in a threefold increase in Hong Kong 
exports to China from the 1950 level of $US 14,000 to $US 335,080 
for the six-month period prior to June 1951.36 On the other hand, 
shortly after the war began, British firms in China, for example, 
suddenly and swiftly became victims of the UN embargo of China 
which Britain agreed to observe. Under these conditions any 
British trade with China became difficult. In response to the 
embargo, most Western nations, including Britain, restricted their 
trade with China to items such as cotton, fertilizer, textile 
machinery, dyes and drugs. 
In this context, China feared the complete halt of imports 
from abroad. 37 Because of the conditions imposed by the Korean 
War and the UN embargo, China abandoned normal methods of 
commercial trading and financing in favor of various types of 
barter deals in which exports were permitted only against 
virtually assured imports. Any imbalances which accumulated 
36. Even Luard, op. cit., p. 68. 
37. Pauline Lewin, The Foreign Trade of Communist China, (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1964), pp. 30-38. 
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were kept small and short term. China shifted to barter trade as a 
direct result ot Chma's unfortunate experience when the U.S. 
government froze Chinese assets located in the U.S. Subsequently, 
Peking wanted to avoid maintaining or building up other assets 
abroad that might be frozen without warning or redress should 
America's more forward policy be followed by its Allies in the 
West. 
For their part the Chinese tried to circumvent the effect of the 
embargo in another way, by switching the main flow of China's 
trade from the West to the Soviet and East European bloc. They 
also sought to make it as uncomfortable as possible for those who 
maintained the embargo. What this meant, as Chen Ming, 
China's Vice-Minister of the Foreign Trade Ministry for the East 
China Region, explained to a British firm's representatives, was 
that China was only prepared to trade provided there was "full · 
security for China." Evidently this is why in 1951 the Chinese 
promulgated new regulations denying permission for Chinese 
export goods to be shipped until the purchase money was 
deposited in China by telegraphic transfer. This meant that 
foreign importers and exporters had to finance the cost of their 
imports to China until such time as they could recover their outlay 
from the sale of exports from China. Foreign firms were reluctant 
to remit money to China on the terms demanded. There was no 
guarantee in the event of a non-executed contract that the goods 
would be shipped or that the deposit would be refunded. 
AP. part of the Chinese policy of obtaining "full security for 
China," the Chinese required that all foreign contracts be 
guaranteed against non-compliance. Because British banks 
charged an insurance fee of one-eighth of one percent of the value 
of the contract and put a time limit on their guarantees 
unacceptable to China, British firms established a policy of 
guaranteeing each other's contracts. For example, in the event 
that Shell failed to meet the provisions of a contract with the 
People's Government, the guaranteeing firm, Swires, would be 
liable. In this situation many firms decided that the benefits of 
trading with China were outweighed by the risks. 
British firms, then, were obstructed from all sides, not just by 
the Chinese Communists. Prior to the Korean War, the firms were 
trying to cope with new Chinese regulations which effectively 
limited the profitability of China's trade and investment. After the 
Korean War began, becausE' of the UN embargo, firms had the 
new difficulty of locating supplies for export to China in barter 
arrangements acceptable to the British government. Peking, in 
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tum, stiffened in not approving Chinese exports unless suitable 
imports were lined up to utilize the proceeds. Understandably, the 
People's Government was afraid of receiving unusable foreign 
exchange, of acquiring freezable Chinese assets abroad and of a 
drain on outputs without compensating inputs. 
British finns, caught in the middle, feared violating the 
embargo, as well as being placed on an unofficial black-list in the 
United States for trading with China at all. To complicate 
matters, within China there were analogous retaliatory restric-
tions which adversely affected foreign firms. For example, in 
addition to the imports-first requirement of the barter trade, the 
Chinese placed the most popular export items on a "Special 
Export List" requiring foreign firms to obtain official permission 
for exporting. 
The British firms were in a bind. Faced with a Chinese 
government hostile to foreign capitalism and the British govern-
ment's compliance with the U.S.-directed UN embargo hostile to 
China, British firms concluded that from a purely trading angle 
there was little justification for continuing trade with China. For 
the leading British firms' part, however, the firms continued to 
hope that their potential as exporters-importers, if not as foreign 
investors in China, would serve as a basis for preserving good 
relations.38 
The reason good relations were so important for the firms lay 
in the reality of hostage capitalism. Foreign firms wanted to 
reduce their many commitments throughout China. Closure, 
however, was dependent upon the good will of the people's 
Government. Maintaining good will had become especially 
difficult when Britain agreed to the UN embargo of China. Efforts 
at closure on the part of the leading firms were feared by the firms 
to be possibly construed by the Chinese as a "lack of good faith." 
As a result the leading British firms' executives in 1951 saw little 
prospect of ever being permitted to close down their operations in 
China without jeopardizing the potential longer-term trade 
relationship between the People's Government and newly organ-
ized British "China firms" outside China. 
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Chapter III 
"THE BRITISH CHINA TRADE HAS HAD IT" 
A. The "San-Fan" "Wu-Fan" campaigns 
B. "This is Too Much" 
By early 1952 conditions for British investment in China had 
deteriorated to the point that they were no longer described in 
terms of a hopeful "wait and see." The previous months' problems, 
now exacerbated, in the view of the British firms, by China's 
"San-Fan" "Wu-Fan" (Three-Anti Five-Anti) campaigns, affected 
British firms' assessments of their future in China. "Surely the 
picture is very clear for all to see," wrote a British taipan in 
February, 1952, "and the writing is on the wall even in braille for 
the blind ... British China trade has had it."1 Simply getting out 
of China on any terms was unacceptable, but inevitable. 
The decision to withdraw from China was not an easy one for 
British firms. Some firms, especially the larger ones, even con-
sidered retaining their properties, at least legally, in the hope that 
either a new government would one day rule China or that 
conditions of doing business under the People's Government 
would change in order that various British commercial interests 
could once again engage in profit-making. "The obvious maneuver 
would have been to try to conduct our retreat so that the Chinese 
are forced to take over our properties without our consent," noted 
a British businessman."2 
The hope for a return to the previous era's business 
environment presented great difficulties, in the words of another 
taipan, "akin to wishing to give away our cake and still hold on to 
it."3 Even if properties were legally retained, perhaps by a lease 
arrangement, various taxes amounting to large sums of hard 
currency would have to be paid on an option of better business 
conditions in an uncertain future. In the view of British 
businessmen, there was every reason to believe, as a condition of 
that option, that any succeeding non-Communist Chinese govern-
ment might nationalistically say that the British had in fact 
given up their land and buildings under the Chinese Communists, 
1. Confidential document, Shanghai, February 26, 1952. 
2. Confidential interview, London, December 1, 1975. 
3. Ibid. 
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and therefore they belonged to the new succeeding government. 
Realizing this possibility, British firms unanimously agreed to 
enlist the help of the British government with both negotiations 
for the liquidation of British investments in China and for the 
establishment of a new British organization whose purpose it 
would be to trade with China from Hong Kong and London. 
Maintaining China properties in any way was no longer 
considered a possibility. 
A. The "San-Fan" and "Wu-Fan" Campaigns 
Chinese firms and foreign firms were orgamcally linked; they 
did business with each other. It follows that any change in 
business conditions affecting Chinese firms would affect foreign 
firms. This was indeed the case with China's "San-Fan" 
campaigns in late 1951 and early 1952. 
While prior to 1949 the Chinese Communists had developed a 
high degree of organizational skill in an agrarian environment, 
the issue after the Communist Victory in 1949 was whether they 
could handle the task of governing and developing the relatively 
sophisticated and complex urban sector of Chinese society. 
Shanghai, for example, was not simply a war-tom, refugee-
swollen city which would become the industrial heart of the 
People's Republic. Shanghai had also been a base for the defeated 
Chinese Nationalists (KMT) and the center of foreign imperialism 
in China. To the Chinese Communists, Shanghai, therefore, repre-
sented "the struggle against the cynicism of bureaucratic 
capitalist speculation and the dead weight of imperialism."4 
The struggle proved to be lengthy. From the outset the 
Chinese Communists' governing of Shanghai included a system 
of price controls to force out of business private Chinese firms 
involved in speculative ventures. Chinese capitalist elements 
retained, however, a dominant position in Shanghai during the 
first eighteen months under Communist rule. Rapid recruitment of 
new members into the Communist Party to organize Shanghai 
could not and did not prove adequate to prevent continuing 
speculation, corruption and otherwise illegal business dealings 
associated with the permissive atmosphere for which Shanghai 
had been well known under Nationalist rule. 
The party itself, in part, reflected the society within which it 
had developed. Some Communist Party members were willing to 
4. Soong Ching Ling, "Shanghai's New Day Has Dawned," in The Struggle 
for New China, English translation (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1963), p. 
246. 
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enrich themselves by engaging in bribery, the use of public funds 
for private ventures and the sale of public property to private 
individuals.s 
China's continuing struggle against these undesirable ele-
ments in its society and within the Party took the form of a series 
of mass-movement campaigns during late 1951 and early 1952. 
The "San-Fan" (or Three-Anti) campaign against "corruption, 
waste, and bureaucracy" in government offices in the winter of 
1951-52 reviewed the conduct and discipline of Party and non-
Party officials who failed to meet Chinese Communist Party 
standards. The subsequent "Wu-Fan" (or Five-Anti) campaign, 
which grew out of the immediately preceding "San-Fan" cam-
paign, was specifically directed at Chinese businessmen who 
allegedly engaged in bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, 
cheating on government contracts and stealing state economic 
secrets. The effect of the two campaigns was to drastically weaken 
the position of urban capitalists in China. Combined, "San-Fan" 
and "Wu-Fan" reduced the wealth and assets of urban capitalists, 
ostracized many as being potentially dangerous and subversive, 
and eliminated any possibility of their maintaining or achieving 
significant political influence during the period when China's 
leaders wanted to socialize the country's economy. 
The campaigns took the form of wide-scale denunciations and 
confessions encouraged by the Chinese Communist Party. Many 
of the charges espoused the general judgement that private profit-
making was exploitative, the equivalent of "stealing from the 
people." As a result of the campaigns, People's Daily reported in 
October, 1952 that seventy-six percent of all merchants and 
capitalist industrialists in seven cities were found guilty of one or 
more offenses and punished by fines exacted by the newly 
established People's Tribunals.6 At the same time, while the 
Tribunals required the payment of various fines, Chinese firms 
were prohibited by law from hiring or firing workers, altering 
their wages, borrowing private capital or ceasing to operate. 
The combination of economic hardship and psychological 
demoralization so weakened China's capitalist sector that the 
Chinese Communist leadership was able to organize and reinforce 
a variety of control mechanisms, rejuvenated labor unions, for 
fi. The best analysis of "San-Fan" "Wu-Fan" which I have relied on, is John 
Gardner. "The Wu-Fan Campaign in Shanghai," in A Doak Barnett (ed.), Chinese 
Communist Politics in action ISeattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 477-
.'139. 
6. People's Daily, October 1, 1952. 
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example, in an effort to prevent a resurgence of bourgeois 
influence. Most Chinese firms, weakened by the mass campaigns 
that forced them to accept loans from the People's Bank, simply 
became managers of production under state control and direction. 
The campaigns "pushed private industry and commerce a step 
towards state capitalism," Chou En-lai later remarked. 7 
The "San-Fan" "Wu-Fan" campaigns were conducted with 
such intensity and effectiveness against Chinese firms that 
foreign firms were affected as well. "Everything per force has 
come to a virtual standstill," wrote a British businessman from 
Shanghai. R Many Chinese government offices and Chinese firms 
opened for normal business two hours a day, which barely 
enabled them to deal with day-to-day routine business and made 
all new business of any consequence out of the question. Chinese 
firms which normally would have had business dealings with 
British firms were tied up with "San-Fan" "Wu-Fan" activities. 
Beyond that, British firms came under direct fire in the 
campaigns over matters concerning irregular practices, wages 
and corruption. To illustrate, British firms usually paid higher 
wages than most Chinese firms; jobs with these firms were 
enthusiastically sought by Chinese workers.9 Since most British 
employers relied on a gang-boss system, whereby the number one 
foreman recommended the workers to be employed, foremen 
acquired immense power over workers seeking jobs. In exchange 
for work, foremen usually exacted tolls from the wages of both 
men and women workers, and with attractive women they 
frequently exacted other favors as well. Sustained criticism of 
these practices during "San-Fan" "Wu-Fan" disrupted business 
for British firms. 
On another level, one British firm's staff got directly involved 
in the campaigns when an Insurance Department head was 
locked up and fined by the Chinese authorities for passing 
business contracts in Shanghai to Hong Kong where taxes were 
more favorable to the firm. 
Events seemed to go from bad to worse for British firms in 
China. Under the impact of the mass campaigns in China, the 
courts ruled that it was illegal for any Chinese worker not to 
receive his wages or for his livelihood to be jeopardized in any 
way. Although this was a monumentally reasonable decision from 
7. Chou En-lai, "A Great Decade," in Ten Great Years (Peking: Foreign 
Language Press, 1960), p. 27. 
8. W.C. Gomersall, The China Engineers, Ltd., "Quarterly Review," No-
vember, 1951. 
9. Ibid. 
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the worker's point of view, British firms found it very difficult to 
accept. From their point of view, past practices should be a guide 
for the present. As a result, in March, 1952, a British executive, as 
the responsible person for his firm's accounts, was locked up for a 
week by a judge of a People's Tribunal for the firm's failure to 
meet its February 1952 wage bill for 200 Chinese workers. 
In an effort to resolve the problem, a leading British firm 
asked for a reconsideration by the People's Tribunal of the firm's 
need for financial assistance to meet wages, as well as the 
payment of the firm's 1951 income tax without a penalty for late 
payment. In the previous year, 1951, the firm had been able to 
borrow from the Chinese-owned Best Service Bank and the 
National Industrial Bank of China. Now, however, because of the 
"San-Fan" "Wu-Fan" regulations, borrowing was not permitted. 
The British firms' financial problems can be appreciated from 
the beverage sales record of one British bottling firm from 1946 to 
1951.10 In each of these years, the average sales for January and 
February combined had been 18,384 cases of various beverages. In 
contrast, sales for January and February of 1952 amounted to 
only 2,713 cases. The difference, in the firm's view, was largely 
attributed to China's virtual deprivation of the foreign firm's right 
to sell. The People's Government had recently established a 
government bottling enterprise, amounting to a government 
monopoly on bottling production and sales. As a result the foreign 
bottling company's lack of local revenue created another problem 
for the firm. The balance of its 1951 income tax was due on March 
12 and was now accumulating a fme of one percent per day on 
unpaid tax.w 
In order to free its Shanghai-based executive the $HK 
equivalent of $US 25,000 was raised from a friendly British firm 
with the aid of the Hong Kong Bank to help pay February wages 
and the previous year's income tax. In the meantime, in spite of 
the government bottling company's virtual monopoly, British 
business executives hoped for enough spring sales of various 
beverages to provide revenue for operating expenses and to 
prevent another visit to the Shanghai jail. 
B. ((This is Too Much" 
Until now the larger British firms had planned to continue 
operating its various enterprises in China. A year ago foreign 
executives were less certain that their firms would have an 
10. Confidential interview with a British taipan, London, December 1, 1975. 
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unprofitable future in China; now it was universally agreed that 
"the crux of the matter is what is the least expensive way of 
saying we plan to quit." How to do this, of course, was a great 
issue when the Chinese government, and not British firms, 
decided all business conditions. "There are increasing signs of the 
bill mounting up every day we delay," and "this is too much," 
added a taipan. 
Consequently, in March, 1952, China Association member 
firms agreed that business conditions were so irreversibly dismal 
that the British government should be asked to use whatever 
offices it might have to expedite closure for British firms in 
China.U An initial, immediate concern, noted in a China 
Association memorandum, was how firms could be protected from 
being required by the conditions of hostage capitalism to remit 
funds from outside China to British firms in China. An often 
proposed, but never implemented, defense was enactment of 
British government-enforced licensing restrictions on the transfer 
of sterling in China. China firms in the spring of 1952 heatedly 
discussed this defense but were afraid that such a licensing 
system might only bring swift retaliation by the Chinese. 
Individually, each firm was making its own withdrawal 
plans. As a part of one plan, several firms advocated a collective 
approach among China firms working closely with the British 
government. A central component of this approach entailed 
announcing a date for cutting off all remittances from abroad in 
order to force negotiations for closure to begin. Even if all of the 
firms could agree that it was time to withdraw, there was not, 
however, a consensus to establish a cut-off date for remittance of 
Sterling to China. The British banks did not like the idea of a 
deadline date at all, because they had commitments to the 
Chinese government for the return of U.S. dollars which the U.S. 
government had frozen. British American Tobacco, on the other 
hand, was engaged in its own negotiations for closure with the 
Chinese which, in the view of British American Tobacco, were 
coming to a close. Shell, having been expropriated outright a year 
earlier, was only interested in getting its five remaining staff 
members out and opposed any deadline. In short, all of the firms 
still perceived themselves as being in their own canoes and still 
hoped to find a paddle or two that would allow individual profits 
11. China Association telegram to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
"Withdrawal of British Firms from China-permits for Sterling Remittances," 
March 18, 1952, and Leo Lamb, British Charge d'affaires in Peking, to British 
Foreign Office, March 17, 1952. 
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so they could paddle according to their own specific circumstan-
ces. Without unanimity among them, the British government, of 
course, would not consider arranging the restrictive licensing 
procedures discussed. 
Despite the lack of agreement on a cut-off date, various firms 
and the British government were still able to agree to a plan of 
action they hoped would expedite closure. A "two-shot" approach 
was finally accepted. First, a statement was to be sent to the 
Chinese by Leo Lamb, the British Charge D'affaires, who would 
simply note that the various disabling policies affecting British 
firms could only result in the elimination of British business 
interests in China. This first note hopefully would pave the way 
for a second note asking for negotiations to begin for the 
liquidation of British firms in China.12 
Though in a poor bargaining position, British firms and the 
British government hoped to be able to deliver the notes in such a 
way as not to provoke the People's Government into sudden and 
violent reaction, especially at the local level. British firms in 
London and in Hong Kong worried immediately about the safety 
of British staff in China, though their long-term concern was with 
Britain's presence in Hong Kong and the future of Sino-British 
trade. 
Knowing that the involvement of the British government in 
negotiating with the Chinese government was not likely to 
significantly reduce the pressures of hostage capitalism, the 
various firms' executives continued to pursue their own efforts 
towards closure. It was a difficult no win situation. On the one 
hand, a collective approach required the gamble that individual 
concerns of various firms might be sacrificed to a greater degree 
than in an individual effort. On the other hand, the firms feared 
that negotiating individually for withdrawal would increase the 
likelihood that "not only will (one firm) be played off against the 
other but outstanding contracts might have to be executed to the 
letter." So, serious problems existed even if fears of retaliation 
against British staff in China, Hong Kong or future trade proved 
groundless. 
Various schemes were proposed within each British firm to 
achieve the fastest possible closure. A problem for one of them, 
getting rid of the burden of Hong Kong-domiciled companies, 
12 For the first two notes see Great Britain, Foreign Office, Correspondence 
Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Central People's Government ol China on British Trade in China, 
Peking. April 12.July 5, 1952 (Cmd. 8639) (London HMSO, 1952), p. 2-3. · 
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included as an initial proposal the washed-sale of the parent 
firm's controlling shares in the subsidiary firms so that the parent 
firm could be disqualified under Hong Kong law from acting as 
general managers. 
"In order to play really safe, it seemed to me," wrote a British 
taipan, "that the transfer should not be domiciled in the Far 
East. I am wondered therefore about a suitable 'stooge' 
company, registered, let us say, in Montevideo, which would 
be prepared to hold these shares under a declaration of trust 
in favor of the firm."13 
The idea was for a purchaser to pay the market price of the parent 
firm's shares, for which the parent firm would reimburse the 
purchaser immediately from reserves held abroad. This, in the 
view of the taipan, theoretically would have permitted the parent 
firm to forfeit the Powers of Attorney for the subsidiary 
companies and to be free of responsibility for the subsidiaries' 
liabilities. 
The problem with this scheme, as Chinese authorities made 
very clear, was that the People's Government was not in the least 
interested in the technicalities of Hong Kong business ordinances 
or in the various attorneys' agreements between British parent 
firms and their subsidiaries. To discourage a leading firm's 
liquidation tactic, the Chinese authorities, perhaps aware of the 
nature of the firm's internal discussions, showed great interest in 
the possible transfer of parent company shares by asking for 
detailed lists of shareholders in the subsidiary companies. More 
conclusively, the Chinese reasserted that no firm could give up its 
responsibilities without the approval of the People's Government. 
In practical terms British firms were learning once again that 
China was indeed calling the shots. 
Yet, if only because British firms did have obligations to their 
shareholders, the firms could not consider Hong Kong business 
ordinances at Attorneys' agreements to be unimportant. In the 
case of moving towards liquidation, for example, one British 
firm's directors felt obliged to comply with Hong Kong Ordinan-
ces in getting the majority of the firm's shareholders to pass a 
resolution in favor of liquidation. Otherwise, in the event of a 
successful closure in China, the firm's directors feared fines for 
non-compliance with Hong Kong business law and liability suites 
against the directors by the more powerful of the shareholders in 
Hong Kong. The firms were on the defensive from all sides. 
13. Cf. 10. 
THE BRITISH CHINA TRADE HAs HAD IT 39 
For the time being, however, British firms had no option but 
"to sit tight" in anticipation of the British Diplomatic Notes, the 
first of which was communicated by Leo Lamb to the People's 
Government on April 12, 1952. As previously planned, this note 
outlined the firms' difficulties and added, "If this situation 
continues it can only result, sooner or later, in the elimination of 
British business interests in China to the detriment of friendly 
relations between China dnd the United Kingdom." A second 
British Note was communicated to the Chinese on May 19, even 
before China had replied to the first note. This second note stated 
the obvious: "Nearly all, if not all, of the British companies in 
China had come to the conclusion that (the change in Sino-British 
business conditions brought on by the Chinese Communist 
Revolution) necessitates a corresponding change in the nature of 
their obligations and in the scope of their activities."14 Closure, as 
the British charge d'affaires put it, was in order, although the 
firms still hoped to perform a useful service in the interests of 
Sino-British trade, the proper machinery for which, as the note 
went on to suggest, should be established. 
All of Britain's Diplomatic Notes, including a third one in 
November, 1952, sought a quick resolution of the difficulties 
facing British firms. But the British would offer nothing in return, 
not even relaxation of the trade embargo. Theoretically, British 
options were many. They varied from publicity through "planted" 
articles in Western newspapers, to cutting off remittances, to 
closing Chinese banks in London or Signapore, to halting the 
purchase of Chinese exports or even to the withdrawal of the 
British Charge d'affaires. In fact, there was little that Britain 
could do to facilitate a rapid withdrawal. The steps Britain might 
have taken probably would have produced only a "mounting 
spiral of reciprocal brutality," a "game" which Humphrey 
Trevelyan, British Charge d'affaires to the People's Government 
from 1953 to 1955, pointed out later "we were unlikely to win."15 
The British Notes then could be little more than pleas for mercy. 
The People's Government replied to the British Notes in 
July. 16 As expected by the firms, the reply did not help them. 
Chang Han-fu, responding on behalf of the People's Government 
asserted that "the predicament of the British firms in China was 
14. Cf. 12. The third note was merely a reminder to the Chinese that British 
firms were having difficulties and a further plea to help ease those troubles. 
15. Humphrey Trevelyan, Worlds Apart: China 1953_55, Soviet Union 1962_5 
(London: MacMillan, 1971), p. 59. 
16. Cf. 12. 
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the bitter fruit of the policy of trade control and embargo of the 
British Government ... by following the U.S. Government in 
carrying out the trade control and embargo." Chang Han-fu 
argued, "the British Government had not only contravened but 
also jeopardized the interests of the British people.1' 
Because of what the Chinese viewed as the British Govern-
ment's official hostility, the People's Government refused to 
establish full diplomatic relations with Britain. Relatedly, Peking 
was not prepared to discuss closure for British firms with the 
British government. Instead of dealing with the matter of British 
interests in China with the British government, the Chinese 
preferred to respond directly to approaches from the British firms 
involved. 
The third party involved, China, did not object on principle to 
taking over British industrial assets. Yet Chinese terms were 
expected to be hard, partly in response to the historic policies of 
imperialism employed by Britain against China. More imme-
diately, in 1952, China feared increasing diplomatic isolation from 
the West. The U.S. Navy, for example, was pressing for a blockade 
of the entire China Coast. As a matter of prudence, the Chinese 
therefore tried to prevent isolation by holding hostage the various 
British firms which while being restrained from closing, would be 
certain to exercise their influence on the British government 
against such a blockade. 
When the Chinese government was prepared to allow the 
firms to leave, the terms were expected to be difficult. Nobody 
doubted this since early signs all pointed in that direction. Among 
them were the demands made on a number of leading British 
firms by trade unions in Tientsin. These demands, which the 
Chinese government required to be accepted before serious 
discussion of closure could even take place, included: (1) one and 
one-third months of regular wages per year of service as severance 
pay to Chinese workers; (2) six months wages for termination of 
employment; (3) six months salary as discharge fee owing to 
closure of business: and (4) a home-leave travel allowance equal to 
ten percent of the discharge fee. 
Given the difficulties in Tientsin and the likely troubles with 
closure applications to follow in Shanghai, one British firm's 
directors decided to try to negotiate closure on the basis of the 
firm's holdings, with the greatest liabilities to be negotiated first. 
The parent firm basically involved itself in the export-import 
trade as well as the general managerships of several subsidiary 
companies. With little foreign trade taking place, the firm's 
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directors decided to make a case for closure on the basis of its 
assets in various property holdings against accumulating liabili-
ties (as viewed by the firm) due to the difficulty of doing any 
export-import business. 
As a shipping enterprise at a time of little or no actual 
shipping business, this firm's monthly overhead of the People's 
Dollar equivalent of $US 20,000 in workers' wages made it 
necessary for the firm to bring in remittances from Hong Kong, 
totaling $US 400,000 in Hong Kong Dollars in 1951. Not 
surprisingly, the firm's directors were anxious to cease operations. 
The firm's representatives went to the Shanghai Foreign Affairs 
Bureau on September 9, 1952 with estimates of assets and 
liabilities to begin closure negotiations. 
A big discrepancy between assets and liabilities on the side of 
assets was intentional. The big discrepancy was desirable as 
others wishing to add to the firm's liabilities and to question the 
total of its assets were expected to be less inclined to bother if the 
assets total were sufficiently large. Assets were listed to be the 
RMP equivalent of $US 1,500,000 based on a recent Shanghai 
Realty Guide Association valuation of the firm's principle land 
and buildings. Liabilities were figured to be the RMP equivalent of 
$US 250,000.17 
The Chinese authorities expressed little interest in the 
favorable reports of the firm's own balance sheet's assets and 
liabilities; the separation of various assets was merely legalistic. 
The Chinese saw through the disingenuous tactic of trying to 
close the parent firm before closing the associated firms. As 
Managing Agents with Power of Attorney for various subsidiary 
companies, the parent firm, Chinese authorities reasoned, would 
not be eligible for closure until the accounts of various subsidiary 
companies were first settled. In short, the Chinese, and not the 
British firm, decided in what order the firm's holdings would be 
liquidated. The order that would be used would reflect China's 
interest, and not the firm's. 
Pursuant to the Chinese decision that the parent firm could 
only follow closure of the subsidiary firms, parent firm executives 
then focused their attention on the two companies, which had the 
two largest deficit accounts, and on another subsidiary as well. 
One subsidiary was in crisis, in the view of the firm's executives, 
especially because of the average monthly clinic and medical 
expenses for its nearly 200 workers. Because of new Chinese 
regulations, in 1952, the average monthly expenses for medical 
care had risen from the previous year's average of $US 250 in 
L 7. Confidential Document, Shanghai, September 7, 1952. 
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RMP to the RMP equivalent of $US 2,000. In the case of a 
different subsidiary, liabilities in November 1952, according to the 
finn's records, had become forty-five percent of the estimated 
assets based on a 1946 valuation. The valuation of various 
shipping industry assets, Chinese authorities argued, was now 
figured too high because of poor business conditions, negligence in 
maintenance and the inability of the parent firm to find a Chinese 
finn interested in buying. 
These early negotiations concerning closure of a leading 
British finn's assets reflect and epitomize the historic turnabout of 
the foreign business environment in China created by the Chinese 
Communist Revolution. The exchanges between a firm's execu-
tives and Chinese Foreign Affairs Bureau officials, for example, 
are archetypal. They show the confrontation between different 
interests, social systems and world views as well as the inability 
of the weaker party, here, the British firm, to assert itself 
forcefully in that confrontation. The historic shift in relative 
power allowed the Chinese to collect from British firms a part of 
what they viewed as an historic debt for past exploitation. 
A typical example of this confrontation is incorporated in the 
following deadpan conversation between a British business 
executive and a Chinese official in November 1952: 
British business executive: 
The reason why our bottling company has to cease 
production is not because of a shortage of resources. There is 
pelnty of material to carry on more production, but continued 
production without sales would only mean spoiling and 
throwing away the stock. Our accumulated stock right now is 
more than the amount sold in the past eight months . . . The 
right to sell beverages has been taken away from the 
management because it is impossible for a bottling company 
under foreign management to compete with government-
operated bottling companies whose sale is being pushed 
everywhere in Shanghai to the detriment of (our) firm's. If 
our company were taken over by the Government it would be 
operated at a profit, because the bottling company's plant 
and machinery are the most up-to-date but (they are) a dead 
loss under foreign management. 
Chinese official: 
The question of who is to operate the bottling company will 
be decided by the authorities concerned, but until that 
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question is decided (the parent firm) should be responsible for 
the operation, production and the workers' welfare. 
British business executive: 
(The firm) will, of course, do their best to manage the bottling 
company, but (the firm) cannot be responsible for lending 
money to the bottling company. 
Chinese official: 
I have not said anything about the parent firm lending 
money to the bottling company. I said the parent firm should 
be responsible. Whether or not you lend money is for you to 
decide. 
British business executive: 
(The parent firm) will certainly do their best. I just want the 
Bureau to understand and appreciate the extreme difficulty 
the bottling company is in, and ask the government to assist 
the company by expediting a closure decision. 
Chinese official: 
Yes, until the government has made its decision (the parent 
firm) should be responsible. If anything happens affecting 
bottling production and staff welfare, or anything in 
contravention to Government regulations, (the parent firm) 
will be held responsible. 
British business executive: 
I assure you (the parent firm) will do their best and (the 
parent firm) has never intentionally done anything in 
violation of government laws and regulations. Incidently, 
may I know what the Comrade had in mind when he 
mentioned "in contravention to government regulations?" 
Chinese official: 
You must know what things are within the law and what not 
without my telling you anything. You know, of course, that 
foreign enterprises operating in China must do everything in 
accordance with Chinese law. 
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British business executive: 
Oh, yes, of course I understand that. Rest assured (the parent 
firm) has never intentionally done anything to violate the 
government law, neither wil-l it do so in the future. 
Chinese official: 
Anything more to say? 
British business executive: 
That is all, thank you, but I do appeal to the Comrade to do 
what he can to expedite a decision on these important 
matters. His assistance would be greatly appreciated. 
Chinese official: 
(nodded) 
A similar exchange between a British business executive from 
a shipping firm and a Chinese Foreign Affairs official illustrates 
the same historic turnabout in business dealings in China. Unlike 
in the past, when the British firm's major concern in China had 
been to earn profits to be remitted to London, the demands of · 
hostage capitalism now necessitated that the company's highest 
priority be meeting the labor union's demands for better health 
care, even if that meant providing imported medicines to workers. 
In the new context, the firm had little recourse but to abide by 
Chinese rules and regulations as they were emphasized in the 
following discussion. The Chinese official's simple, straightfor-
ward language underscores China's awareness that it had 
attained the superior position during all closure negotiations. 
Chinese official: 
Until your application for closure is approved by the 
Government you must continue to maintain the livelihood of 
your employees. And it is our opinion you should continue to 
do business, and curtail your expenditure at the same time. 
Open up the sources and check the flow, as we say. 
British business executive: 
I quite understand all of this but doing business is 
practically impossible and our unions make it difficult to 
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reduce expenditure. The heavy drain caused by the Clinic 
and Medical Expenses is a reason. The management has no 
control over these expenses which are entirely at the mercy 
of the Union. We have recently appealed to the Union to cut 
down on medical expenses but have gotten nowhere. The 
majority of the patients demand imported medicines al-
though they know there are locally made medicines just as 
good and costing only a fraction of the expensive imports, 
which must be bought with foreign exchange. 
Chinese official: 
If the expenditure is beneficial to the health of your 
employees you have to spend the money. 
British business executive: 
And the Tax Bureau says we must pay income tax. We lost a 
lot of money last year and the year before. The tax officer, 
Comrade Wu, has frequently visited our firm and knows all 
our profit and loss situation; but the Tax Bureau recently has 
said we must pay Income Tax on an estimated basis for 1952. 
Chinese official: 
How much is your income tax? Have you received your 
demand notice? 
British business executive: 
We were told a week ago that we were to be assessed (the 
RMP equivalent of $US 11,000). I went to the Tax Bureau 
and protested strongly and I hear the amount has been 
reduced to between the (RMP equivalent of $US 2,000 and 
$US 3,000). But even this is too much to a firm that lost a 
great deal of money last year; there should be no income tax 
on losses; we have not yet received the demand notice. I 
understand that it will be sent to us next week. 
Chinese official: 
The Tax Bureau does things in accordance with government 
regulations. They make an estimate according to the general 
conditions of a trade, fix a sum to be assessed, and collect in 
advance. Then the Tax Bureau will inspect your books, and if 
they find you have lost money, they will refund the money 
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collected, or require you to make up more if your books prove 
you have made a profit and have paid less than you should. 
British business executive: 
Yes, I understand . . . 
During these discussions between British business executives 
and Chinese officials the central issue was not yet the actual 
terms of the firm's closure, but whether or not the firm presently 
would be considered eligible to make the application for closure. 
The negotiations for closure would have to come later. This 
unhappy situation for British businessmen made any considera-
tion given by Chinese authorities to their business difficulties 
appear as a hopeful sign.18 Therefore, when the Chinese gave a 
British-owned bottling company permission in November to 
dispose of surplus equipment and, at the same time, purchased 
1,500 cases of various beverages, the firm's directors took comfort 
in at least being able to meet the rest of the year's wage bills 
without bringing into China any more hard currency. The 
continuing difficulties of the various firms in Shanghai, not to 
mention similar problems among British shipping offices in other 
Chinese cities, did not, however, foster bright expectations. If 
nothing else, the firms hoped that when closure ~ventually did 
take place, a much discussed trade relationship with China from 
abroad, rather than inside China, would permit continued profit 
making. 
The future, however, was tied to the present. To realize 
expectations of future trade relationships with China, the various 
British firms felt that they had first to allay Chinese fears that 
closure and withdrawal were part of a plan to further retaliate 
against China for its involvement in Korea. This is why Leo 
Lamb in his Diplomatic Note of May 19 stated that "while 
existing machinery is not appropriate to present-day needs, the 
firms feel that they can still perform a useful service in the 
interests of Sino-British trade."19 
18. Virtually all China Association memoranda for 1952 suggest possible link 
between closure and future trade. For general discussions of these issues see Evan 
Luard, Britain and China (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 
Robert Boardman, Britain and the People's Republic of China, 1949-1974 (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1976), and Brian Porter, Britain and the Rise of 
Communist China (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). 
19. China Association, H.J. Collar, for "China Affairs Committee HK," to Leo 
Lamb, May 15, 1952. 
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To this end, the possible establishment of a trade association 
to stay on in China after all closures was a continuing topic of 
discussion among British businessmen in the fall and winter of 
1952. Two alternative proposals were discussed. One was for a 
loose association of representatives who, with Peking's approval, 
would act as contract men in Peking to keep British manufactures 
abreast of Chinese trade developments, but who would not accept 
responsibilities for the behavior of individual manufactures in 
Hong Kong or London. The other was for a trading company 
which would act as an agent for British importers and exporters. 
For two reasons the prevailing view throughout 1952 favored the 
former. 
First, because individual firms and their human agents were 
in difficult straits, in part because of taxes and tax fines, no 
British China firm wanted to assign to an agent in China any 
business that might attract Chinese tax liabilities. The firms 
wanted to close down and avoid such troublesome responsibilities 
in the future. A trade company in China therefore was contradic-
tory to the single most important goal of the various British firms 
getting out of China. 
Second, a loose association was favored because of the 
different preferences for closure and future trade among individ-
ual firms. The easiest way to make a consensus proposal to the 
People's Government was to let the association start with the 
most flexible terms of reference and try to solve its problems as 
they arose. 
The firms agreed, however, that merely raising the issue of 
future Sino-British trade with Chinese authorities might help their 
negotiations for closure. A possible bargaining chip for the firms 
with the Chinese, which was never played, was to propose the 
establishment of a trade association with the precondition that a 
Peking-approved closure of direct investments precede its opera-
tion. 
Nobody knew in mid-June, 1952 what the Chinese reaction to 
a trade association proposal would be. When an outline of the 
proposal was finally presented to the Shanghai Foreign Affairs 
Bureau in late summer 1952, the Chinese quickly announced their 
position that such a trade mission should be established prior to 
the various firms' withdrawal from China. 
The Chinese were in no hurry to ease closure for the firms. 
Nor did they accept responsibility as the exclusive or prime source 
for the firms' difficulties. The Chinese blamed strategic trade 
regulations enforced by the British government for much of the 
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difficulties of the various British firms. Not only did the People's 
Government feel that the British government's position was one 
of hostility towards the new People's Government but in addition, 
that many of the traditional British firms were psychologically 
incapable of accepting the Chinese Communist Revolution and 
were seeking excess profits "as if China were still the old corrupt 
foreign colony."20 
Because of these various problems associated with the old 
China firms, China saw the possibility of doing business with 
other, more sympathetic British firms. When China sent delegates 
. to the Moscow Economic Conference in April, 1952, they ignored 
the old-China-hand British firms by signing agreements with a 
British delegation of assorted British businessmen and left-wing 
politicians for $US 28 million.21 None of the traditional British 
firms were represented. As a result the old firms feared their 
complete exclusion from future Sino-British trade. China's 
establishment of major trade offices in East Berlin and rumors 
that China planned completely to circumvent Hong Kong for 
trade with the West exacerbated these fears. 
British firms continued throughout 1952 to find themselves 
caught in the difficult confrontation and transition of the initial 
Cold War Period. As business in China grew less and less 
profitable during China's "San-Fan" "Wu-Fan" campaigns, the 
British firms, which in the previous era had been able to do much 
as they pleased, now wanted to cease operations and withdraw 
from China. China, however, was not willing to simply approve 
their applications for closure. In these difficult times the firms 
hoped at least in the future to play an important role in Sino-
British trade from their home bases of Hong Kong or London. But 
even that prospect appeared increasingly dim· as China increas-
ingly showed signs of preferring to exclude the old British China 
firms from future China trade. 
China now was calling all the shots, signalling to British 
firms possible future problems. The British government, as a 
world power and the once military backbone of imperialism in 
China, was, like the old China firms it had once fought for, now a 
lingering remnant of an era the Chinese Communists were 
helping to put to rest. 
20. See South China Morning Post, May 6, 1952. 
21. Boardm~n, op Cit. 
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Chapter IV 
BETWEEN TWO ERAS: THE OLD AND NEW BUSINESS 
ENVIRONMENTS IN CHINA 
A. The Process and Terms of 
Closure 
B. After Closure: Trading with 
China 
As British firms and China moved between two eras in their 
relations, China's control of its economy became more clear than 
ever before as hostage capitalism came to an end in summer 1954. 
The "hope and wait and see" attitude at the time of the Chinese 
Communist takeover changed to hopelessness and desperation in 
early 1953. Although generally speaking British firms decided to 
cease operations and to withdraw from China in early 1952, only 
in· early 1953 did the various firms realize how expensive, in the 
firms view, closure was to be, yet after the firms closure and 
withdrawal from China, many of which came in 1954, the firms' 
relations with China did not end. They simply changed. 1 
In a desperate effort to gain permission of the People's 
Government to withdraw from China, a leading British firm 
agreed in January, 1953 to negotiate its assets against liabilities 
for a complete Chinese takeover of the firm's China operations. 
Disputes over the value of these assets and liabilities reflected the 
different parties' interests and prolonged the negotiations. The 
firm tried to speed up the slow, espensive process by a variety of 
means. A trip to Peking by a British taipan was even considered 
"with the sole object of saying to Chang Han-fu (China's Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs), 'How much money will China take to 
allow (the firm) to close down immediately?'" 
The problem was that the various firms' directors were tired of 
remitting funds from Hong Kong while they waited passively and 
hoped for closure applications to be approved and :;he terms of 
final agreements for closure to be settled. The Chinese, however, 
were not to be rushed into approving closure applications or 
settling the terms of closure until they, and not the firms, were 
ready to do so. 
"As to giving you the Government's decision in a short 
time," a Shanghai Foreign Affairs Bureau official told a 
1. Confidential document. Shanghai, May 18, 195a. 
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British business executive, "please ·remember (that) this 
bureau has repeatedly said to you that as (your firm) has 
been in China for years and years and in consequence has a 
larger number of problems, it will take the Government some 
time to study (your application) . . . (you) cannot expect a 
defmite answer in a short time."2 
Chinese officials reminded British executives that the People's 
Government had never said "no" to the firm's application for 
closure. 
China's "yes" in response to British firms' closure applica-
tion, however, only came gradually. Many subsidiary firms were 
taken over by China soon after the Korean Armistice in July, 
1953. As a reflection of the general improvement in Sino-British 
relations, the closure agreement for one leading parent firm was 
finally negotiated in summer 1954, several months after the April 
Geneva Conference. Final closure agreements cannot be attrib-
uted solely to the Geneva Conference. Concurrently, China's 
entire economy was being nationalized. By mid-1954 that process 
was in its advanced stages. 
After several of the British firms' withdrew from China, their 
relationship with China continued on a new basis as they played 
a major role in developing Sino-British trade relations. From 
Hong Kong the firms traded with China without the direct 
investment and involvement in China's economy which marked 
the pre-Communist era in China. This current remodeled relation-
ship between the firms and China apparently has proved to be 
mutually acceptable. 
A. The Process and Terms of Closure 
Even at the expense of abandoning assets in China, British 
firms only hoped in the spring of 1953 to be able to negotiate a 
withdrawal from China. One British firm had already remitted to 
China the Hong Kong Dollar equivalent of $US 2,000,000 with no 
prospect of improved business conditions. In order to meet 
continuing overhead, the firm tried wherever possible to raise 
local funds from the sale of unnecessary machinery, for example, 
a few trucks and accounting machines. But these sales had to be 
approved by the People's Government, which instead preferred 
that the firm remit foreign currency. The firm increasingly was 
desperate to close, if only to cut off remittances to China. 
2. Confidential document, Shanghai, April 5, 1953. 
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In the firm's view the continuing need to remit from Hong 
Kong led them to propose the formula of offsetting assets against 
liabilities as a basis for permission to withdraw from China. 
Using the 1942 British Shanghai Realty Guide to calculate the 
firm's assets, the firm's managers in their own interest attempted 
to extract themselves from China in the least painful manner. 
While the firm used the Realty Guide's terms of the past era to 
carry the firm into the present transitional era, the Chinese 
rejected what they saw in this method as a continuing attempt on 
the firm's part to assert imperialist prerogatives. The Chinese 
pointed out that, unlike in 1942, the firm's assets now had no 
value since there were no potential buyers. Without a capitalist 
environment they were no longer profitmaking concerns. 
The unprofitability of the firm's assets was a primary reason 
given for China's rejection of the firm's calculations of its assets 
and liabilities. A second reason for China's rejection of the firm's 
efforts to cease operations arose when China challenged whether 
the firm even owned what were claimed as assets because of the 
manner in which they were acquired or because of other liabilities 
unrecognized by the firm. On the basis of one British firm's 
unprofitability, for example, the People's Government argued that 
it would have a difficult time in helping the parent firm find a 
private Chinese firm willing to take over the firm's responsibilities 
due to the unhealthy state of the subsidiary company. A Chinese 
government takeover was considered an impossibility, too. 
When China agreed to discuss the terms of closure for the 
various British firms, disputes inevitably arose over the basis for 
the firm's calculations of assets and liabilities. In the case of a 
British Sottling company, China argued that in 1945 the bottling 
company had illegally taken over significant Japanese materials 
and stocks. The parent firm could not prove the asserted 
legitimacy of the acquisitions because it had no record that the 
takeover was ever processed through the Chinese Alien Property 
Department. There were more mundane disputes and problems to 
be settled as well. A Chinese "takeover" firm insisted, for 
example, that as a condition for the Chinese takeover, the British 
firm provided the Chinese firm with blueprints of the bottling 
plant. They could not be located. 
Illegally acquired assets was not the only problem for 
negotiating British firms' closure and withdrawal from China. As 
a final condition for the Chinese takeover of a British firm's 
shipping agency in Tientsin, the People's Government required 
that all contracts made up to the time of closure must be exactly 
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performed. But performance was made difficult by the British 
trade embargo against China, illustrated in the contract between 
the British firm and the China N aitonal Import and Export 
Corporation, made prior to the time of closure negotiations, for the 
installation of a boiler to be used at a hydroelectric plant near 
Tientsin. Performance of the 1950 contract required that the 
British firm provide thirty-eight cast and forged steel valves that 
were only available from the highly industrialized countries of the 
world, such as Britain. The problem in 1953 was that these valves 
were included on the British government's embargo list for trade 
with China. The British firm claimed that liability for nonperfor-
mance of the contract was precluded by force majeure clauses in 
the original contract. The Chinese disagreed by insisting that it 
was simple misfortune for the firm to have to share in some of the 
hardship created by Britain's policy of attempting to economically 
strangle China. As a consequence of the exact performance policy, 
China's Steel and Iron Administration threatened to sue the 
British firm for nonperformance of the contract. In computing 
their claim for damages, the British firm's relevant internal 
memorandum notes, 
"the Chinese had it worked out that if the boiler had been 
delivered on time . . . (and) had been erected immediately 
they could have produced so many millions of kilowatts 
between then and January (1954), amounting to a fantastic 
figure, some RMP 117 million (or $US 5,000) per day, which 
had been lost to the country and for which they intended to 
make a claim."3 
Faced with the possibility of this enormous claim, the British firm 
and the British Charge d'affaires in China lobbied successfully for 
the British government's approval of the necessary export licenses 
for the valves. The Chinese threat of making a claim was 
withdrawn when the valves' license was approved by the British 
government in June, 1953. 
China's firmness in ·enforcing various measures, such as 
insisting contracts be exactly performed, prolonged hostage 
capitalism and raised the levels of frustration and impatience 
among British firms whose influence was ending. The firm 
experienced losses throughout 1953, and the firm's directors often 
described prospects for closure as "disappointing," a "deadlock," 
or "dreary as a funeral." Once more, in early 1953, the firm 
3. Confidential document, Shanghai, April 8, 1953. 
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considered cutting off remittances from Hong Kong but the idea 
was vetoed for fear of a negative effect on the twin goals of 
quickly withdrawing from China and trading from abroad 
afterwards. Months later, in an effort to speed up what the firm's 
directors thought was an inevitable closure, the British govern-
ment sent the Chinese Foreign Affairs Bureau another note 
seeking "renewed assistance in causing instructions to be issued 
so that facilities may be given to British firms to close at an early 
date." In the same vein, a British taipan even appealed directly to 
Prime Minister Chou En-lai in a telegram. A follow-up letter, 
which apparently was never answered, suggested the possibility 
that he might visit Chou in Peking to settle all outstanding 
matters for withdrawal. 
Limited settlement of British firms' closure was made possible 
by the easing of tensions between China and Britain as the 
Korean Armistice in July, 1953 drew near.4 It was only after the 
Korean Armistice that China appeared willing to complete closure 
negotiations. The protracted negotiations for the withdrawal of 
the parent firms were partially eased by the Geneva Conference of 
April, 1954 which resulted in generally improved Sino-British 
relations. Coincidentally China was moving quickly in 1953 and 
1954 to completely socialize its economy; too much significance 
could not be attached to the Korean Armistice or to Geneva as an 
explanation for the end of hostage capitalism.5 
After the Korean Armistice, negotiations for the closure of 
British firms in China progressed steadily. In the case of a British 
bottling company, a Chinese takeover was finalized in late 1953. 
Another British firm reached a settlement with the China Ocean 
Shipping Agency in mid-December, 1953 when the British firm 
agreed to a cash payment of the Hong Kong Dollar equivalent of 
$US 37,000 towards unpaid taxes and fines accumulated on 
unpaid taxes. 
The progress towards closure did not always immediately 
include the British parent firms. The parent firms' closure was 
settled only after the Geneva Conference in April, 1954. It was 
during the Geneva Conference that Anthony Eden, Britain's 
4. See, generally Evan Luard, Op. Cit., and Robert Boardman, Op. Cit. 
5. On the trend towards a completely socialized economy see George Ecklund, 
"Protracted Expropriation of Private Business in China," Pacific Affairs, Fall, 
1961, p. 244. The percentage of total industrial production in 1954 was 19.9':1,; for 
1955, 13%; for 1956, nil. The percentage of total wholesalE' trade in 1954 was 10%; 
for 19.'i.'J, 4.,;,; for 19.'i6, nil. The percentage of total retail trade for 1954 was 26.5%; 
for 1955, 8";,; for 1956, 2.9'ci .. 
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Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and China's Prime Minister Chou 
En-lai discussed a number of questions affecting relations 
between Britain and China, including the difficulties of British 
firms in China. 
As a result of the Geneva talks between Eden and Chou, a 
Chinese diplomatic mission was established in London under a 
Charge d'affaires, corresponding to the British post in Peking. In 
a brief period of near cordiality between Britain and China, Prime 
Minister Chou En-lai agreed personally to look into sources of 
conflict between China and Britain, including the closure of the 
British firms. As if to emphasize China's interest in improved 
relations with Britain, a month after the Geneva Conference 
ended, when a British civil aircraft was shot down by Chinese 
aircraft with the loss of ten lives, the Chinese government 
surprised the world by publishing an immediate apology and 
paying in full the claim for compensation subsequently sought 
(requested) by the British government:6 . 
How much this brief detente in Sino British relations helped 
British firms is difficult to ascertain without access to Chinese 
sources. Even after Geneva, British businessmen discovered that 
the assets-for-liabilities formula, as it was envisioned by the firms' 
directors, did not easily work. 
"Eventually it will boil down, I suppose, to the price-cash 
payment the Chinese will want from the firm to be allowed to 
close the doors," 
a British businessman predicted. 7 
The difference between the two parties were not simply issues 
involving extortion. As with any liquidation scheme a number of 
issues were raised in British firms' closure in China. Unlike in the 
past, however, China's superior bargaining position dictated 
inevitable closure terms which were unacceptable to the firm. 
China was sympathetic to its workers' needs and not to British 
staffs needs. 
It is on the basis of China's sympathies that the cash 
payment which one British firm was required to make appears to 
have been justified. During the negotiations for the closure of a 
particular British firm in early 1954, for example, thirty-one of the 
6. "Chang Han-fu Answers Trevelyan in Case of British Aircraft," NCNA-
English Peking (July 26, 1964), in SCMP, No. 856:1 (July 27, 1954), reprinted with 
discussion in Cohen and Chiu (eds.), Op. Cit., pp. 740-71. 
7. Confidential document, Shanghai, December 30, 1953. 
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firm's seventy-three remaining Chinese employees who were 
qualified under an agreement of February 1950, decided to retire. 
Under this agreement they were entitled to certain pay. If only 
thirty-one employees decided to retire the cost would have been the 
Chinese equivalent of $US 70,000. If all seventy-three qualified 
workers wished to retire, which the British firm feared might be 
the case, the firm's directors calculated the cost of the retirement 
would be the RMP equivalent of $US 100,000. The firm argued 
that in effect the Chinese authorities would be taking over all of 
the firm's assets and only a portion of the liabilities in requiring 
that the firm provide the funds for the retirement of these workers. 
The Chinese did not agree, and the firm was required to remit the 
HK dollar equivalent of $US 60,000 as a final settlement of the 
matter. 
China's insistence that employment agreements with this 
British firm strictly be adhered in one particular case affected two 
of the firm's British employees. During the closure negotiations 
two members of the British staff made applications for retirement. 
If approved, this would have required that the firm provide six 
months' pay in addition to a pension for life. The Chinese 
authorities, however, insisted that the firm's employment agree-
ments indicated that employees were only entitled to these 
circumstances under specific circumstances, which had not been 
met. For example, an employee was entitled to six months' leave 
only after completing forty-two months' service. Neither employee 
had fulfilled this obligation. Further, according to the agreements, 
an employee was eligible for pension only after completing fifteen 
years of service and attaining forty-five years of age. One 
employee was fifty-two, while the other was forty-one. 
The firm argued that since closure was a special circum-
stance, even if these men did not exactly fulfill the terms of the 
employment agreements, they should be allowed pension benefits. 
The Chinese, in contrast, argued that the agreements provided the 
relevant standards for deciding the issue and, based upon them, 
the two men were not entitled to these benefits. As a result, if the 
two men were to retire, funds for this, according to Chinese 
authorities, should come not from the British firm's China 
operations in the form of a remittance from China, but instead 
from the firm's reserves held abroad. The Chinese apparently saw 
the entire matter as a disguised remittance abroad from the firm's 
China accounts. 
China's rejection of disguised remittances reflected the 
country's determination to retain as much as possible of British 
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firms' China-based assets. A dispute which focused on transporta-
tion provisions from China to England for the two British 
employees mentioned previously also illustrates that determina-
tion. A British negotiator insisted that they should travel by first 
class since managers always traveled by first class. 
The Chinese official replied: 
"We cannot find any provision to that effect." 
British firm's negotiator: 
"Can you find any provision that they should travel by 
second class?" 
The Chinese official (pointing to a paragraph in an agreement): 
"here is the provision." 
British firm's negotiator: 
"This agreement is a dead one. It expired in 1942." 
Chinese official: 
"They came by second class." 
British firm's negotiator: 
"There are some precedents that foreign staff were allowed to 
travel by first class." 
Chinese official: 
"We have noted such precedents. But they were deviations 
from the regulations." 
How the British employees returned to England is not recorded! 
in this British firm's records. It would be surprising, however, if 
they returned to England by first class transportation from the 
firm's China accounts. More likely, the firm's Hong Kong office 
made up the difference between first and second class transporta-
tion. 
Once these and other issues were settled between British firms 
and China, a settlement could be reached for the closure of the 
firm's China operations. By summer, 1954, a complete settlement 
was made with several of the leading British firms whereby China 
simply took over the firm's remaining responsibilities in exchange 
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for the firm's various assets. Apparently the British firms in turn 
received no compensation. Typically when the Shanghai assets 
were turned over to China the firms' assets in various China 
outports, Hankow, Swatow, Foochow, Tsingtao, and Canton, for 
example, were similtaneously relinquished as well. Most of the 
outport agencies had managed to avoid building up great 
liabilities by using the revenue from renting their properties to 
meet overhead. For purposes of closure the only liability usually 
involved in close agreements was the pay-off of Chinese workers 
in accordance with the firms' employment agreements. In 
Foochow, which would not seem to be unrepresentative of the 
other outports, this amounted for one British firm to a remittance 
in Hong Kong Dollars of $US 11,000 before closure was agreed to 
by all of the parties. 
As the closure of one British firm's China operations reached 
its final stages in the summer of 1954, all foreign personnel 
previously employed by the firm were gradually given exit permits 
to leave China. 
In the new environment which evolved after the Chinese 
Communists took over, firms like Swires, the Hong Kong 
Shanghai Bank and Shell, among others, had been caught in the 
process by which China used its inherited forces of production to 
transform its economy into a socialist one. Some of these firms' 
directors hoped that as part of this transformation a new mode of 
doing business might be acceptable to the Chinese government. 
With the firms' still sizable reserve held abroad, their directors 
hoped to rebuild the firms from outside China as import-export 
firms for the China trade. After establishing a new base of 
operations in Hong Kong they applied for permission to set up 
trading correspondent's offices in Peking. The request was denied, 
but as it turned out this denial had little effect on the firm's later 
development as a China traders and as dominant firms in the 
Pacific region as well. 
B. After Closure: Trading with China 
As a reaction to the favorable foreign business environment of 
pre-Communist China past, the People's Government trade policy 
has been repeatedly stated: "China is willing to restore and 
develop international trade relations with governments and 
peoples of other countries, on the basis of equality and mutual 
benefit."H During the years of hostage capitalism and the years 
t<. One example, among many, of this position is "Statement by the Chinese 
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Chang Han-fu, on British Trade ·with China, 
July 5, 1952" in Cohen and Chiu (eds.), Op. Cit .. p. 698. 
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that followed, China has used its power and influence with British 
firms to defend itself against discriminatory trade policies 
reminiscent of the previous era. In the process these firms have 
played key roles in developing a new era's trading institutions. 
Throughout the years of hostage capitalism the Chinese 
insisted that the root cause of Sino-British trade difficulties was 
Britain's trade restrictions on the export of various goods to 
China, which increased the difficulties of British firms in China 
and affected China's import and export trade with Britain. The 
Chinese rather explicitly argued that, "(t)he predicament of the 
British firms in China (was) the bitter fruit of the policy of trade 
control and embargo of the British government."9 Taken literally, 
the Chinese seem to have argued that without British trade 
controls and the embargo, the terms for other British firms' 
withdrawal from China might have been easier. To what degree 
the terms would have been easier for the firms is impossible to 
know. 
One indication that the British firms would have had an 
easier time of hostage capitalism was the Chinese reaction to 
restrictive trade policies. China redirected as much of the Sino-
British trade as was possible away from the traditional China 
firms into entirely new British channels.1° China sought to deal 
directly with manufacturers in Britain, even though early efforts 
do not appear to have been fruitful. More significantly, until1954, 
China tried to conduct negotiations in trade matters with Britain 
only through the exclusive means of various politically sympa-
thetic organizations. Prior to 1954, for example, China's trade 
offices in East Berlin often dealt with British businessmen only if 
they were acting under the auspices of the British Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade, or later, the London Export 
Corporation. 
Neither the old British China firms nor the British govern-
ment was happy with this arrangement. If they could no longer 
invest in China the old China firms wanted at least to trade with 
China. Some firms involved in hostage capitalism even counted 
on this possibility as a kind of compensation for enduring the 
difficult terms of withdrawal from China. The British Govern-
ment believed that, in contrast to the new "fellow-traveler" firms, 
the older British China firms would be more likely to co-operate in 
following British Government trade policies. In November, 1953, 
the British Government declared the British Council for the 
9. Ibid., p. 699. 
10. Cf. 1. 
BETWEEN Two ERAS 59 
Promotion of International Trade to be a Communist-front 
organization and warned British businessmen against taking part 
in its activities. In November, 1955, the British Government 
reminded the British Parliament that the decision to use the 
British Council for the Promotion of International Trade was a 
matter. for the "patriotic judgment of each British firm or 
individual."11 
In the cordial mood of official Sino-British relations at 
Geneva in July, 1954, British Government officials made a 
strenuous effort to persuade the Chinese Government to redirect 
trade between Britain and China into more traditional channels. 
The effort was successful; as the Chinese authorities openly 
declared their willingness to deal with the old British China firms. 
As a result, in June, 1954, a new semi-official British China trade 
organization, the Sino-British Trade Committee (later council), 
came into being. This new organization had no imperialist history 
with which it could be associated; although it represented the 
China Association, the Federation of British Industries, the 
National Union of Manufacturers, the London Chambers of 
Commerce, and the Association of British Chambers of Com-
merce. In behalf of these member organizations the Sino-British 
Trade Committee invited a Chinese mission to Britain in late June 
and early July, 1954. China accepted. 12 
At these meetings, which were a kind of courtship between 
British commercial interests and China, the former successfully 
promoted a Sino-British policy which provided that trade with the 
latter should be channeled through an organization that was 
acceptable to traditional British China interests. The leading 
Chinese official at the meetings even expressed his pleasure that 
the British delegation included a number of old China firms which 
were represented and whose experience in the China trade was of 
much value in China. Relatedly, the Chinese expressed a new 
flexibility in dealing with merchants instead of manufacturers. 
Major British "China firms" enthusiastically welcomed this new 
development. 
China's leaders evidently realized that the old British China 
firms could play a valuable role in helping to develop Sino-British 
trade. China desired trade with the West, so the older China firms' 
reputation within the West as dependable importer-expqrters was 
useful. Without an international sales network of its own, China 
must have realized the precarious status of organizations like the 
11. Evan Luard, Op. Cit .. p. 129. 
12. Ibid. 
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British Council for the Promotion of International Trade. Trading 
with such organizations was no way to improve official Sino-
British relations. It was the same firms which China had 
nationalized domestically, which China had to cooperate with for 
the sale of China's products abroad. They provided China access 
to Sterling deposits, insurance headquarters, and commodity 
market centers.l3 Because of their size and experience with these 
matters in the China trade, firms like Swires and Jardine 
Matheson in Hong Kong, were especially suited to China's needs. 
A Chinese official expressed China's new flexibility this way: 
As to the question whether a merchant or a manufacturer is 
preferred (by China), an experienced businessman would 
never affirm this before negotiations start. Generally 
speaking, it seems that trade with manufacturers are more 
direct and convenient than dealing with merchants. However 
. . . a merchant sometimes acts as a good bridge between 
buyer and seller in cases where buying and selling terms 
differ. Sometimes it is also possible that merchants are in a 
position to offer more favorable terms than the manufac-
turer. China's foreign trade organizations do not oppose the 
possibilities that the merchants can under certain conditions 
offer their services to both buyers and sellers. 14 
Although no specific contracts were negotiated in the summer 
of 1954, on the basis of statements like these by Chinese officials, 
British businessmen from the older China firms viewed the 
discussions to have been a great success. A return trip to China by 
British merchants who were affiliated with the Sino-British Trade 
Council met with progress on the trying question of payments, 
which were made difficult by the Korean War. China agreed to 
payments by irrevocable letters of credit instead of by letters of 
guarantee, and to adopt other adjustments to earlier trade 
requirements. 
Major difficulties between Britain and China continued after 
the brief detente brought on by the Geneva Conference. Britain 
did not unilaterally relax controls on the China trade until 1957. 
This irritated China. Concurrently, it was not until_1957 that the 
last British firm, Patons and Baldwins, was allowed to cease 
operations and withdraw from China. 
13. Edward Friedman, "The International Political Economy and Chinese 
Politics," Stanford Journal of International Studies X, Spring 1975, p. 6. 
14. Confidential document, London, August 2, 1954. 
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After the relaxation of the British embargo in 1957 an 
intensive trade drive was conducted by British exporters. "A large 
British motor manufacturer," writes Evan Luard, "placed a 
quarter-page advertisement in the People's Daily six times the size 
of any normal advertisement in that paper." 1·" In a different era 
perhaps these advertisements would have helped to penetrate the 
China market. 
Although in the aggregate Sino-British trade has been 
limited, for a few British firms the China trade remains very 
important. Now in Hong Kong their philosophy of successful 
private enterprise has remained what it has always been. "We 
deal in anything we can make money at," a Jardine Matheson 
director has said. 16 
With major interests throughout the Pacific, Jardine Mathe-
son as well as Swires, are more diversified than ever before. The 
firms' long experience in Asia enabled them to adapt successfully 
to a new business environment. Through their established 
contacts with the appropriate Chinese organizations and knowl-
edge of Chinese needs and prices, the firms have become leaders 
in providing trade information, which would be prohibitively 
expensive for Western firms to supply for themselves. For the 
Chinese Jardine Mathesons's or Swire's knowledge, for example, 
of Western markets and prices has been of great value as well. 
It is on this basis that as an agent, a principal, or a 
consultant, these firms sell, among other items, fertilizers, 
livestock, cotton, and machine tools to China and buys back from 
China 20,000 tons of rice annually, as well as soy beans, animal 
and vegetable oil, hog bristles, and furs. From the selling side of 
the trading relationship, the firm acts as an agent for many 
British manufacturers -in Asia. In the early 1960's Jardine 
Matheson helped to negotiate the sale to China of six British 
turbo-prop commercial aircraft. More recently, the firm has 
15. Evan Luard, p. 14. 
16. See Noel Barber, "China Traders Extraordinary," The Reader's Digest, 
July, 1953, p. 67; Alan Demaree, "Old China Hands Know How to Live with New 
Ais," Fortune, November, 1971; Alexander Frater, "Mandarins from Dumfries· 
shire," Daily Telegraph (London), October 5, 1973, pp. 58-66; Joseph Lelyveld, 
"Jardine's -Where the Hong Kong Action Is," in New York Times, January 13, 
1974; Vickers, da Costa and Co., Ltd., Research Group, The Swire Group: Unknown 
Giant. November 1973. "An Old China Hand Readies for a New Wave of Trade," 
Business Week, May 21, 1979, pp. 108-109. 
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negotiated the sale of Western drill ships and piping for the 
development of China's oilY 
As British firms' contemporary China trade demonstrates, 
their relationship with China did not end with hostage capitalism. 
It only changed. After the Geneva Conference in 1954, the 
traditional British China firms began to play an active role in 
developing Sino-British trade relations. From Hong Kong, British 
firms have traded with China without the direct investment and 
involvement in China's economy which marked the pre-
Communist era. 
17. South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), December 12, 1974. 
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Chapter V 
HOSTAGE CAPITALISM IN PERSPECTIVE 
Hostage capitalism illustrates and illuminates the transition 
from the relatively receptive Kuomintang era's foreign business 
environment to the more hostile business environment brought on 
by the Chinese Communists. After the Chinese Communist 
Revolution, China's leaders were determined that China would 
control its own destiny without the direct foreign influence 
characteristic of the previous era. 1 This effort towards the control 
of China's economy included a nationalization policy - what I 
have called hostage capitalism, the success of which was 
determined by the balance of political forces inside and outside 
China.2 In perspective, what stands out is the pragmatism of the 
various parties to this transitional policy, which has allowed their 
new relations to develop in a mutually beneficial way. 
Nationalizing foreign assets often includes the risk of 
retaliation by the foreign parent country if a mutually acceptable 
compensation is not agreed to by both parties. In the Chinese case 
Britain's weakened position in the balance of world forces lowered 
the risk of retaliation when China's bargaining position allowed 
the terms of nationalization to be decided solely by the Chinese. 
On the one hand, hostage capitalism included the refusal of the 
People's Government to permit, by any means, the closure of 
industry or business of any value to the nation's economy. On the 
other hand, Chinese regulations insured by way of various 
measures, wage and tax policies, for example; that the firms 
would cease to be profitmaking. Until closure applications were 
approved by the People's Government, at least one of a firm's 
senior European executives was denied an exit permit to leave 
China. In order to meet obligations, and in order to even have the 
possibility of having a closure application considered, the firms 
had to remit funds from abroad to China. In effect, during the 
nationalizing process a reverse compensation took place. 
1. See, for example, Mao Tse-tung, "Report to the Second Plenary session of 
the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," Selected 
Works, Vol. IV, Op. Cit. 
· 2. I do not draw any distinction among confiscation, expropriation, or 
nationalization. All of these terms mean state acquisition of private foreign 
property. 
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Yet hostage capitalism was not simply a policy of revenge for 
the historic injustices of the previous era. China's new socialist 
society had to be built on the inherited foundations, that is - the 
inherited relations and forces of production of the previous era. 
These foundations could only gradually be transformed. Political 
and economic realities meant China's leaders had to move step-by-
step in the transition from an era of a foreign-dominated capitalist 
urban economy to one in which China would own the means of 
industrial production. 
The design of this pragmatic transitional policy appears to 
have been only broadly drawn in advance by China's leaders. The 
timing of the transition appears to have been uncertain and had 
to be worked out over the course of the policy's application in 
practice.3 Party leaders often disagreed with basic-level cadres in 
implementing a dualistic industrial policy, which by definition 
affected both Chinese and foreign private enterprise in China. 
Over the long run the state sector was to lead, and eventually 
eliminate the private sector of the economy. Thus, private 
capitalists were required to accept greater restrictions, and 
workers were increasingly to assume their position as a relatively 
more powerful force in Chinese society. Over the short run, 
however, the need to increase production and to unite with private 
capitalists until their skills could be replaced, or, in the case of 
native Chinese capitalists, until they could be won over, were 
more inimediate needs. 
, To the extent that foreign capitalists had a role to play in the 
transition, the policy of hostile capitalism reflected China's strong 
bargaining position with foreign firms. Although in the long run 
China wanted to drive foreign capitalists out of the country, in the 
short run there was every reason not to hurry the process. In the 
short term, the policy of foreign hostage capitalism provided jobs 
for Chinese workers who were employed to engage in production 
at the firms' expense. At the same time, while China trained its 
people to take over these firms, the firms were building up 
liabilities which eventually would be used to offset the firms' 
assets upon their withdrawal from China when the country was 
ready to socialize its economy. 
The difficulties of China's transition to a socialized economy, 
which in any case was going to exclude foreign firms, were 
exacerbated by the U.S. led policy towards China of diplomatic 
isolation and economic strangulation. Britain's leaders perceived 
3. See Kenneth Lieberthal, "Mao vs. Lin? Policy Towards Industry and 
Commerce, 1946-1949," China Quarterly, No. 47, 1971, pp. 494-520. 
HosTAGE CAPITALISM IN PERSPECTIVE 65 
their greater post-World War II interest to lay with the U.S. and 
respected much of the U.S.-designed restrictive trade policy which 
British firms opposed. There is some reason to believe that had 
Britain followed these policies the terms of hostage capitalism 
would have been easier on the firms. 
During the period of the Korean conflict, China's leaders 
seldom missed an opportunity to point out that Sino-British trade 
relations would greatly improve if only the British Government 
would cease its restrictive policies towards China. In two specific 
instances China bargained for Britain to cease acquiescing in 
policies of isolation towards China. First, in the summer of 1950, 
China offered a package of concessions to Britain for Britain's 
approval of China's admission to the United Nations.4 Among 
these concessions was a "guarantee that no discriminatory action 
would be taken against British business in China;" British 
registered ships would be permitted to ply freely along the China 
coast; through traffic on the Kowloon-Canton railway would be 
resumed: a promise would be given not to· effect any blockage 
"material or moral" of Hong Kong; and trade agreements would 
be concluded with Britain on the basis of equality.5 Second, 
China's linkage of Britain's compliance with hostile policies 
towards China was clear in Chang Han Fu's reply in July, 1952, 
to official British Government requests for China's help in 
arranging "for the transfer as going concerns, custory, or 
closure," of British firms in China. China's reply was that the 
firms' difficulties were "the bitter fruit of the policy of trade 
control and embargo of the British Government." This alone, the 
note continued, "sufficed to prove that by following the United 
States in carrying out the trade control and embargo, the British 
Government not only (had) contravened but also (had) jeopardized 
the interests of the British people."6 
After the Korean War, when British trade controls could be 
expected to cease, China apparently hoped for improved relations 
with Britain and agreed to partially ease the terms of hostage 
capitalism. Subsidiaries of some of the major British China firms 
negotiated closure agreements. Yet China was still unhappy with 
Britain's trade controls which were expected to be relaxed after 
the Korean War. Later, in the cordial atmosphere between China 
4. China Association Bulletin, No. 49, June 20, 1950, p. 1. 
5. I have relied here on Evan Luard, Op. Cit., pp. 140, 155-175 and Robert 
Boardman, Op. Cit., pp. 92-109. 
6. See "Statement by the Chinese Vice-Minister for Froeign Mfairs, Mr. 
Chang Han-fu, on British Trade with China," July 5, 1952, Op. Cit. 
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and Britain several months after the Ko~rean Armistice at the 
Geneva Conference, Chou En-lai and Anthony Eden discussed a 
variety of outstanding problems in the relations between the two 
countries.' As a result, Chou En-lai agreed that China would move 
towards negotiating final closure agreements with British firms 
still in China. Almost immediately, replacement visas were 
granted more easily to British staff in China. Firms were allowed 
to cut down staffs. And the discussions on closure between 
Chinese officials and representatives of the various firms 
proceeded more smoothly. After more than four years of hostage 
capitalism Swires and Jardine Matheson, for example, ceased 
operations and withdrew from China in summer, 1954. Other 
firms withdrew as well. 
Although an immediate benefit of the Geneva talks seems to 
have, been easier withdrawal for some British firms, hostage 
capitalism did not completely end with some of the larger firms' 
withdrawal from China in 1954-55. Perhaps because of Britain's 
tardiness, in China's view, in unilaterally taking action to relax 
trade controls against China, the last British firm to leave China, 
Patons and Baldwins, was not permitted to do so until 1957. It 
was in 1957 that Britain moved away from the U.S. led embargo 
of the China trade. Yet with or without improved Sino-British 
relations, foreign firms could be expected to be absorbed in the 
accelerated assimilation of private enterprise in China towards 
the end of 1955. 
China has said very little about its general policy of 
nationalizing foreign firms or specifically about unhappiness of 
the foreign firms subjected to the coercive nature of hostage 
capitalism. 
Whether any body of rules now exists setting limits to the 
means that a government can use to obtain the investor's consent 
to nationalization is a much debated issue. There appears to be 
quite general agreement that some international restraint exists. 
"Indeed, those states which take the circuitous route of expropria-
tion by consent," writes a distinguished legal scholar, "appear to 
do so either in recognition of the existence of an international 
understanding or out of a practical desire not to advertise their 
defiance of it."8 China's leaders in this context need not have been 
worried about the possibility of favorable intervention by the 
British state. They no doubt did concern themselves, however, 
7. See China Association, "Annual Report," 1957. 
8. Detler F. Vagts, "Coercion and Foreign Investment Rearrangements," in 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 195, No. 2, p. 126. 
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with their policies' impact on the new government's international 
credit rating and the possibility of adverse effects on international 
economic institutions generally. To this day both Chinese officials 
and representatives of British firms are reluctant to speak openly 
about the difficulties of hostage capitalism. 
Chinese officials have told this author that strictly speaking 
nationalization never took place.9 But they are simply being 
disingenuous. Because China so completely controlled the busi· 
ness environment of the various firms the People's Government 
could confidently wait for the firms to request permission for 
closure and the Chinese could in effect orchestrate that closure. 
During hostage capitalism, year after year of poor business 
conditions continued to absorb local funds and require reserves 
from abroad to be brought in to meet overhead. Although the 
terms of closure were unacceptable in the sense that British firms 
were obliged to turn over their assets in exchange for mounting 
liabilities, these terms of closure were inevitable as well. In this 
situation, the firms were relieved to sign an agreement for closure 
if only to stop being required to bring monies from abroad. China 
gradually tightened regulations, increased taxes, and fixed lower 
prices until diminishing profitability broke the foreign firms' 
resistence to what for their boards of directors was a depressing 
"no-win" situation. British businessmen were trapped and no 
amount of business acumen could rescue them. Chinese govern-
ment action had so distorted earnings that earnings as a partial 
measure of the value of the various firms' assets became 
completely artificial. A fortiori there was no set of competing 
buyers for British, or other foreign firms, in China. Very 
considerable, well-orchestrated non-market factors thus deter-
mined the legally questionable validity of the waiver of rights to 
future claims fo!." compensation, which foreign managers were 
forced to sign upon ceasing operations and withdrawing from 
China.10 
9. Confidential Interview, Peking, March 15, 1973. 
10. Another indirect, non-market, way in which foreign property, mainly land 
and houses of private persons, was nationalized in China was by simple 
abandonment by the owners. Property was treated as ownerless if it was not 
registered with-the local land office. Ownerless land was taken over by the local 
land administration bureau and the government reserved the right to expropriate 
such land. At various times notifications were inserted in the Chinese press by the 
authorities listing properties that would be treated as ownerless unless formal 
claims were made, in which case taxes were usually owed. Evidently such notices 
appeared only in Chinese newspapers, there are many in Jie fang jih-pao in the 
early 1950's, the export of which was prohibited. In many cases the properties were 
not identifiable because of changes in street names or street numbering. 
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Beyond limited comments, China has .s.aid nothing about its 
own nationalization program for foreign firms. Even in the 
decrees which took control of U.S. assets in late 1950, China 
avoided all references to "confiscation," "expropriation," or 
"nationalization."11 On two major occasions when China did 
confiscate foreign property outright, the Chinese stated that these 
actions were taken specifically in retaliation for British actions in 
Hong Kong.12 One case, in May, 1951, involved the requisitioning 
of all installations of the Shell Oil Co. in China after the Hong 
Kong Government took possession of an oil tanker of which the 
ownership was in dispute in China. A second case involved a 
judgment in July, 1952, by the Hong Kong Government that forty 
aircraft standing in Hong Kong, tlie ownership of which had been 
claimed by the People's Government, should be handed over to a 
U.S. airline company. ·Following this action, the Chinese authori-
ties requisitioned the British registered Shanghai Dockyards Ltd. 
and Moliere Shipbuilding and Engineering Works. 
In the only Chinese article on the general subject of 
nationalization, Li Hao-p'ei noted in 1958 that nationalization of 
private property for public purposes is recognized under interna-
tional law as a proper exercise of a state's sovereignty.13 In the 
absence of specific requirements, Li also argued that the payment 
of compensation is at the discretion of the nationalizing state, as 
long as it does not discriminate in the application of its policy.14 
Few writers would disagree with Li that a state has the right to 
nationalize as an exercise of its sovereignty. These writers would 
question, however, if there are limits to the means employed to 
exercise this right. How, for example, is consent to nationalization 
11. For a useful discussion of this and other Chinese nationalization issues, 
see James Chieh Hsiung, Law and Policy in Chin's Foreign Relations, A Study of 
Attitudes and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 136-143. 
12. An apparent exception was the February, 1953 requisitioning of the 
Canton assets of Butterfield and Swire for which I have not been able to leam of 
the specfic reason. See "Canton Military Control Committee Requisitions 
Property of Butterfield and Swire," Nan-fang jih-pao (February 25, 1953) in SCMP, 
No. 519:15 (February 25-26, 1953) and reprinted in Cohen and Chiu, Op. Cit., p. 
700. 
13. Li Hao-pe'i, "Nationalization and Intemational Law," Cheng-fa yen-chiu 
(Studies of Politics and Law), No. 2:10-15 (1958), p. 204, reprinted in Jerome A. 
Cohen and Hungdah Chiu (eds.), People's China and International Law, Op. Cit., 
pp. 718-729. 
14. China did seem to adopt a discriminatory policy because while British (and 
other Westem) concerns were being put out of business, joint enterprises were 
operated under formal agreements with the Soviet Union. 
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negotiated with the party being nationalized? The answer, as 
many generations of legal scholars will attest, is unclear. 
Relatedly, where standards for compensation are referred to 
among writers on the subject, there is a great deal of variation, 
ranging from those that permit the payment of little or no 
compensation to those that require the payment of what may in 
fact amount to full compensation.15 As a result, when nationaliza-
tion of foreign property is involved, it is seldom legal norms, but 
instead the balance of international and internal power relations 
that determine the ramifications of nationalization, with the 
lawyers and legal scholars often serving as the instruments of 
those interests involved. For China, in 1949 the balance tilted 
heavily away from Britain and towards China, so that China 
dictated even the terms of valuation. 
China could not nationalize all of the foreign firms' assets, 
many of which were in Hong Kong and London. This natural 
restraint on the limits of nationalization, and the realism of both 
China and the firms in understanding it, has served the various 
parties well in developing a new relationship. Throughout the 
years of hostage capitalism, the various firms' directors hoped 
that their vast experience in China would allow the firms to 
survive as importers-exporters in the China trade. Since 1954, 
China in fact has employed the firms' power and influence abroad 
as consultants in the interest of promoting Sino-Western trade. 
From all indications the firms have profited handsomely as well, 
especially in the contemporary post-Mao era when China's leaders 
have engaged in a massive effort to increase purchases of foreign 
technology. 
15. For useful discussions of these issues see Richard Lillich (ed.), The 
Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law, Vol. I-III (Charlottes-
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